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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 
78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-2-2(5), Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-16(l)-(2), and Rules 49 and 51 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This appeal is taken from an Order of the Utah Court of 
Appeals denying Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Insurance's (hereinafter "AMERITEMPS") 
Petition for Appeal, which was then appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1.) Pursuant to the Order of this Court dated March 29, 2006, the only issue before this 
Court is whether an initial finding of permanent total disability under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
413 constitutes a final agency action for purposes of appellate review. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Determining whether a final agency action was entered for 
purposes of appellate review directly impacts whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction 
over this appeal and is a question of law, which is reviewed under the 'correctness' standard. 
Housing Authority v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28, f 11, 44 P.3d 724. Where the correctness review 
requires this Court to consider statutory language, the Court must look at the plain language of 
the statute, unless the statute is ambiguous. Id. 
PRESERVATION ON APPEAL 
On July 22, 2003, the Labor Commission entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order. (R. 495-528). On August 21, 2003, AMERITEMPS filed their Motion for 
Review with the Labor Commission. (R. 589-598). On May 3, 2004, the Labor Commission 
Appeals Board issued its Order on Motions for Review. (R. 696-704). On May 21, 2004, 
Barnard & Burk Constructors filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Order on Motions for 
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Review. (R. 705-709). On June 2, 2004, the Labor Commission Appeals Board filed an Order 
Extending Time for Reconsideration. (R. 710-713). 
On June 2, 2004, AMERITEMPS filed its appeal of the May 3, 2004 order. (R. 714-
716). On June 24, 2004, the Labor Commission sent a letter stating that it would take no further 
action with respect to the Request for Reconsideration as AMERITEMPS had filed a Notice of 
Appeal prior to discovering that a Request for Reconsideration had been filed. (R. 722-723). 
On July 20, 2004, the Labor Commission responded that it would go ahead and hear the 
Request for Reconsideration. (R. 838-840). The Appeals Board subsequently extended the time 
in which to consider the Request for Reconsideration to September 30, 2004. (R. 841). The 
deadline was again extended by the Labor Commission to October, 2004. (R. 845-847). The 
Labor Commission Board of Appeals issued its Order Denying Request for Reconsideration on 
October 18, 2004. (R. 848-852). 
On November 4, 2004, AMERITEMPS filed its Petition for Judicial Review and Notice 
of Appeal. (R. 853-854a). On November 10, 2005, the Utah Court of Appeals filed its Opinion 
affirming the Labor Commission's decision regarding permanent total disability but reserving 
the second step proceeding under the statute. AMERITEMPS filed a Petitioner for a Writ of 
Certiorari on December 12, 2005. On March 29, 2006, this Court issued its Order granting 
AMERITEMPS' Petition for Writ of Certiori. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: Mr. Johnny Albert (hereinafter individually referred to as 
"ALBERT") filed an Application for Hearing requesting Medical Expenses, Recommended 
Medical Care, Temporary Total Compensation, Permanent Partial Compensation, Permanent 
Total Compensation, and Other (More surgery, footwear, and pain medication). (R. 98-123A). 
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Prior to his filing, however, ALBERT had filed prior Applications for hearing. He had 
originally injured his back while working for Transwest Construction and had filed a claim, , 
Claim No. 2002595, seeking workers' compensation benefits as a result thereof. 
ALBERT worked for Quality Plating, which was insured by the Workers Compensation 
Fund (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Quality"), and on June 18, 1990, ALBERT re-
injured his low back while lifting some metal plates. (R. 697). ALBERT received medical 
attention and was off work for one week. (R. 697). He incurred a 2 lA % whole person 
impairment rating as a result of his low back injury. (R. 697). 
ALBERT was also injured while working for Barnard & Burk, which was insured by 
National Union Fire Insurance (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Barnard"). He was 
injured on January 21, 1991. (R. 698). The Commission found that ALBERT slipped and fell 
on a pipe and injured his low back. (R. 698). ALBERT received medical attention at the time, 
but did not miss any work. (R. 698). This low back injury caused an additional 2 lA % whole 
person impairment. 
ALBERT also filed a claim as a result of an injury that occurred on on July 28, 1991, 
when ALBERT injured his right foot while working at American Asbestos Abatement, which 
was insured by the Workers Compensation Fund (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
"American"). (R. 698). The injury caused a 9% whole person impairment rating. (R. 698). 
Finally, ALBERT filed a claim for an injury that occurred on June 16, 1997, nine months 
after beginning his employment with AMERITEMPS, ALBERT caught his left great toe in a 
work-related accident. (R. 698). The injury required four surgeries, over a period of 13 months. 
(R. 698). ALBERT did not reach medical stability until February 25, 1999 after which time he 
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was returned to regular duty. (R. 698). ALBERT received a 4% whole person impairment rating 
as a result of this industrial injury and subsequent surgeries. (R. 698). 
AMERITEMPS contends that ALBERT is not permanently and totally disabled as a 
result of his 1997 injury and, instead, ALBERT is allegedly permanently and totally disabled, if 
at all, as a result of his back condition, right leg condition and a subsequent, non-industrial left 
toe injuries, all of which are not related to his work with AMERITEMPS. 
Course of Proceedings: On December 17, 2002, at 8:30 a.m., a hearing was held before 
the Honorable Judge Richard M. La Jeunesse regarding the compensability of ALBERT'S 
injuries and whether he was permanently and totally disabled. (R. 495-528). On July 22, 2003, 
the Labor Commission entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. (R. 495-
528). 
On August 21, 2003, AMERITEMPS filed its Motion for Review with the Labor 
Commission. (R. 589-598). On May 3, 2004, the Labor Commission Appeals Board issued its 
Order on Motions for Review. (R. 696-704). On May 21, 2004, Barnard & Burk Constructors 
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Order on Motions for Review. (R. 705-709). The Labor 
Commission Board of Appeals issued its Order Denying Request for Reconsideration on October 
18, 2004. (R. 848-852). On November 4, 2004, AMERITEMPS filed its Petition for Judicial 
Review and Notice of Appeal. (R. 853-854a). On November 10, 2005, the Utah Court of 
Appeals filed its Opinion affirming the Labor Commission's decision regarding permanent total 
disability but reserving the second step proceeding under the statute. AMERITEMPS filed a 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on December 12, 2005. On March 29, 2006, this Court issued its 
Order granting AMERITEMPS' Petition for Writ of Certiori. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ALBERT originally injured his back while working for Transwest Construction in 1986 
and subsequently injured his low back while working for Quality. While working with Quality 
in 1990, ALBERT was injured in an industrial injury. On June 18, 1990, ALBERT injured his 
low back while lifting some metal plates. (R. 697). ALBERT received medical attention and 
was off work for one week. (R. 697). He incurred a 2 Vi % whole person impairment rating as a 
result of his low back injury. (R. 697). Thereafter, ALBERT submitted no additional medical 
records to Quality for payment. (R. 697). 
The Labor Commission further found that ALBERT, while working for Barnard, was 
injured on January 21, 1991. (R. 698). The Commission found that ALBERT slipped and fell 
on a pipe and injured his low back. (R. 698). ALBERT received medical attention at the time, 
but did not miss any work. (R. 698). This low back injury caused an additional 2 Vi % whole 
person impairment. In his Application for Hearing, ALBERT claimed additional medical 
expenses as a result of this low back injury. (R. 698). 
The Commission found that on July 28, 1991, ALBERT injured his right foot while 
working at American. (R. 698). The injury caused a 9% whole person impairment rating. (R. 
698). After a lengthy period of recovery, ALBERT returned to the workforce with 
AMERITEMPS. (R. 698). 
The Commission found that on June 16, 1997, nine months after beginning his 
employment with AMERITEMPS, ALBERT caught his left great toe in a work-related accident. 
(R. 698). The injury required four surgeries, over a period of 13 months. (R. 698). ALBERT 
did not reach medical stability until February 25, 1999, after which he was returned to regular 
duty. (R. 698). ALBERT received a 4% whole person impairment rating as a result of this 
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industrial injury and subsequent surgeries. (R. 698). The Commission found ALBERT was 
unable to work as a result of the accident with AMERITEMPS on June 16, 1997. (R. 698). 
The Commission further found that ALBERT'S work-place injuries and resulting 
impairments were exacerbated by ALBERT'S low IQ and severe deficits in memory, 
concentration, judgment and other mental functions. (R. 698). The Commission also found that 
ALBERT also suffered from significant depression, which constituted a 30% whole person 
impairment rating. (R. 698). The Commission found that 1/3 of ALBERT'S depression was 
attributable to the injuries and chronic pain from his work accidents, leaving 20% whole person 
impairment rating attributed to non-industrial factors. (R. 698). 
As a result of these findings of fact, the Commission absolved Quality from paying any 
further liability for ALBERT'S medical expenses pertaining to his low back injury. (R. 701). 
The Commission upheld and adopted the ALJ's other orders and denied the Motions for Review 
by Barnard and AMERITEMPS. (R. 701). The ALJ previously ordered that his claims against 
Transwest Construction (the 1986 claim), Claim No. 2002595, were dismissed with prejudice. 
The ALJ further ordered that ALBERT'S claims against the Uninsured Employer's Fund and 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund (Case Nos 97576, 991213, 991214, 20011071, 20011072, 
20011073, and 2002595) were dismissed with prejudice. The ALJ ordered Quality, Case No. 
20011070, to pay temporary total disability, to pay permanent partial disability, and dismissed 
the ALBERT'S claim for permanent total disability with prejudice. 
The ALJ next ordered Barnard to pay permanent partial disability, and to pay all 
reasonably related medical expenses of ALBERT with respect to his back, but dismissed 
ALBERT'S claims for temporary total compensation and permanent total compensation. The 
ALJ ordered that ALBERT'S claims for temporary total, permanent partial, and permanent total 
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compensation against American (Case Nos. 97576, 991214, and 20011072) be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
Finally, the ALJ order AMERITEMPS to pay permanent total disability compensation 
from June 16, 1997, until June 16, 2003, for a total amount of $74,880.00 (Case Nos. 991213 and 
20011073). AMERITEMPS was further ordered to continue to pay permanent total disability 
compensation from June 16, 2003 forward, less fifty percent (50%) of any Social Security 
retirement benefits received by ALBERT for the same period. Lastly, AMERITEMPS was 
ordered to pay medical expenses for ALBERT'S industrial accident of June 16, 1997, and was 
ordered to pay attorney fees in the amount of $10,352 to ALBERT'S attorney. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The only issue before the Utah Supreme Court is whether an initial (tentative) finding of 
permanent total disability under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 constitutes a final agency action 
for purposes of appellate review. AMERITEMPS posits that because Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
413 specifically mandates that an order of the Labor Commission is not final until a second-step 
proceeding is noticed up and conducted by the Commission, an order by the Commission is not a 
final appealable order until after the second step proceeding is noticed up and the employer 
either submits a reemployment plan or waives the second-step proceeding. The Court of 
Appeals already has found that AMERITEMPS did not waive its rights to a second step 
proceeding and found the Commission never noticed any of the parties regarding their rights to a 
second step proceeding. 
AMERITEMPS further posits that the Court of Appeals analysis is the first such decision 
to utilize the case of Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2000 UT 
40, 999 P.2d 17 (articulating factors utilized to determine a final agency action), with respect to 
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Labor Commission cases in determining whether the Commission has issued a final appealable 
order. The Court of Appeals' analysis with respect to Permanent Total Disability cases, 
however, is flawed as the plain language of the § 34A-2-413 specifically mandates when an 
order of permanent total disability is a final appealable order. For other cases involving issues 
not pertaining to Permanent Total Disability, the Court of Appeals analysis would be appropriate 
in determining whether the Commission's various decisions should considered final appealable 
decisions for purposes of review. 
In the instant case, because the Commission did not follow the explicit language and 
procedure detailed in Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(6) with respect to permanent total disability 
awards, the Commission's decision was not a final decision and this matter should be remanded 
to the Commission to conduct the second-step proceeding mandated by statute as already 
determined by the Utah Court of Appeals. When the Labor Commission did not enter an initial 
(tentative)finding of permanent total disability, never notified the parties of their right to submit 
a rehabilitation plan, never requested rehabilitation or a rehabilitation plan, and never entered a 
final order after said processes were conducted, then the Commission's order could not be a final 
order and this matter should be remanded to allow the parties their rights under § 34A-2-413(6). 
ARGUMENTS 
I. BECAUSE THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF U.C.A. § 34A-2-413(6) 
EXPLICITLY STATES WHEN AN ORDER FOR PERMANENT TOTAL 
DISABILITY IS FINAL, THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLICATION OF 
THE UNION PACIFIC TEST TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE WAS IN 
ERROR AND THIS COURT MUST FOLLOW THE PLAIN LANGUAGE 
OF THE STATUTE WITH RESPECT TO PERMANENT TOTAL 
DISABILITY CASES 
Because Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 specifically mandates that an order of the Labor 
Commission is not final until a second-step proceeding is noticed up and conducted by the 
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Commission, the Court of Appeals should have followed the plain language of the statute with 
respect to permanent total disability cases. Under the plain language of the statute, an order by 
the Commission is not a final appealable order until after the second step proceeding is noticed 
up and the employer either submits a reemployment plan or waives the second-step proceeding. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(6)(a). 
The Court of Appeals already has explicitly determined that AMERITEMPS did not 
waive its rights to a second step proceeding. Specifically, the Court of Appeals determined that 
there was nothing in the record and "nothing in the discussion between the ALJ and counsel for 
AMERITEMPS that supports a finding that AMERITEMPS intended to waive its right to submit 
a reemployment plan ..." Ameritemps, Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2005 UT App 491, ^ 13, 128 
P.3d 31. The Court of Appeals further found the Commission never provided notice to any of 
the parties regarding their rights to a second step proceeding. Ameritemps, 2005 UT App 491, Tf 
23 andn. 3. 
Based upon the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(6)(a), the Court of 
Appeals should have remanded this case to the Labor Commission for the second step 
proceeding as the Commission's prior order was not a final appealable order. This Court already 
has ruled that it "will interpret a statute according to its plain meaning and seek to effectuate the 
intent of the legislature." Machock v. Fink, 2006 UT 30, f 16, - P.3d -- (citing, State v. Ireland, 
2006 UT 17, | 11, — P.3d —). The plain language of § 413 (6)(a) makes clear that an order of 
permanent total disability is not final until notice of a second step is provided, the employer 
provides a rehabilitation plan or waives said plan, and the administrative law judge holds a 
hearing on said rehabilitation plan. 
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Instead of remanding the case to the Commission for further proceedings consistent with 
the statute, the Court of Appeals applied the test articulated in Union Pacific Railroad Company 
v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2000 UT 40, 999 P.2d 17, to determine whether the preliminary 
finding of permanent total disability was a final agency action for purposes of appeal. Its 
purpose for doing so was to reconcile "the statutory language with the applicable regulations." 
Ameritemps, 2005 UT App 491, ^ 24. Specifically, the Court of Appeals was attempting to 
reconcile the express language of the Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(6)(a) with the language in 
the Utah Administrative Code R612-l-10(C)(l)(c). Id. 
The Court of Appeals' attempt to reconcile the statute and the regulation was in error, 
because "the rules and regulations of an administrative agency must conform to rather than be 
contrary and inconsistent with statutory law." McKnight v. State Land Bd., 14 Utah 2d 238, 381 
P.2d 726, 730 (Utah 1963); see also, Bradshaw v. Wilkinson Water Co., 2004 UT 38, 1j 33, 94 
P.3d 242. Under this longstanding rule, if the Labor Commission has passed a rule or regulation 
that is contrary and inconsistent with the statutory law, the Labor Commission rule must be read 
in light of the statutory law as opposed to harmonizing the statutory law to the regulation. As a 
result, the Court of Appeals was in error when it attempted to reconcile the statutory language 
with the administrative rules regarding permanent total disability. 
If the Court of Appeals had applied the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
413(6)(a), it would have been forced to rule that the Commission's order was not a final 
appealable action and should have remanded the case to the Labor Commission for further 
proceedings. In addition, the Court of Appeals' analysis is the first such decision to utilize and 
apply the Union Pacific factors to Labor Commission cases in determining whether the 
Commission has issued a final appealable order. 
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The Court of Appeals' analysis with respect to Permanent Total Disability cases, 
however, is flawed as the plain language of § 34A-2-413(6)(a) specifically mandates when an 
order of permanent total disability is a final appealable order. For other cases involving issues 
not pertaining to Permanent Total Disability, the Court of Appeals analysis would be appropriate 
in determining whether the Commission's various decisions should be considered final 
appealable decisions for purposes of review as those decisions not dealing with permanent total 
disability are not regulated specifically by statute. 
In the instant case, because the Commission did not follow the explicit language and 
procedure detailed in Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(6) with respect to permanent total disability 
awards, AMERITEMPS was never afforded the opportunity to submit a rehabilitation plan. By 
not providing for the submission of a rehabilitation plan, the Commission not only did not follow 
the statute, but also violated AMERITEMPS' due process rights by failing to conduct the second 
step hearing. 
As previously noted by this Court, "[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due 
process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under 
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them 
an opportunity to present their objections." Jackson Constr. Co. v. Marrs, 2004 UT 89, P10, 100 
P.3d 1211 (quoting, Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). 
AMERITEMPS was never presented with proper notification of the second step proceeding 
under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(6) despite the significant property rights involved with a 
permanent total disability case. By failing to provide a second step proceeding pursuant to 
§413(6), the Commission failed to protect AMERITEMPS' rights guaranteed by the statute and 
by the Utah Constitution in Article I, § 7. 
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When the Labor Commission did not enter an initial (tentative) finding of permanent total 
disability, never notified the parties of their right to submit a rehabilitation plan, never requested 
a rehabilitation plan or a rehabilitation bearing, and never entered a final order after said 
processes were conducted, then the Commission's cannot be considered a final agency action for 
purposes of appeal and this matter should be remanded to allow the parties their rights under § 
34A-2-413(6) as this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction until such time as the Commission 
issues a final order consistent with provisions in § 413(6). See, Housing Authority v. Snyder, 
2002 UT 28, 1 11, 44 P.3d 724, 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, AMERITEMPS respectfully requests this Court remand this 
case to the Labor Commission for proceedings consistent with the plain language of Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-2-413(6) as the Order previously entered by the Labor Commission was not a final 
appealable order. 
DATED THIS 6 day of June, 2006. 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
THEODORE E. KANELL 
JOSEPH C. ALAMILLA 
Attorneys for Petitioners/Appellants 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copynghl 200^ bv Matthew Bendei & Company, Inc a membei of the LexisNexis Gioup 
All lights leseived 
>
 •»" STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 200^ FIRST SPECIAI SESSION *** 
•*•** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2005 UT 38, 2005 UT APP 290 *** 
* -* JULY 1, 2005 (FEDERAL CASES) *** 
TITLE 34A UTAH LABOR CODE 
CHAPTER 2 WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT 
PART 4 COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIREC1 ORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann $ 34A-2-413 (2005) 
§ 34A-2-413. Peimanent total disability — Amount of payments — Rehabilitation 
(1) (a) In cases of peimanent total disability lesulting fiom an industual accident oi occupational disease, the em-
ployee shall leceive compensation as outlined in this section 
(b) To establish entitlement to peimanent total disability compensation, the employee has the bin den of pioof to 
show by a piepondeiance of evidence that 
(1) the employee sustained a significant impaiiment oi combination of impaiiments as a lesult of the industrial 
accident oi occupational disease that gives use to the peimanent total disability entitlement, 
(n) the employee is peimanently totally disabled, and 
(m) the industual accident oi occupational disease was the dnect cause of the employee's peimanent total dis-
ability 
(c) To find an employee peimanently totally disabled the commission shall conclude that 
(l) the employee is not gainfully employed, 
(n) the employee has an impaiiment oi combination oi impaiiments that limit the employee's ability to do basic 
woik actiMties, 
(in) the industual oi occupational!) caused impaiiment oi combination oi impaiiments pievent the employee 
fiom peifoiming the essential functions of the woik activities foi which the employee has been qualified until the time 
of the industual accident oi occupational disease that is the basis foi the employee's peimanent total disability claim, 
and 
(IV) the employee cannot peifoim othei woik leasonably available, taking into consideiation the employee's* 
(A) age, 
(B) education 
(C) past woik expenence 
(D) medical capacity and 
(E) lesidual functional capacity 
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(d) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability benefits other than those provided under this chapter and 
Chapter 3. Utah Occupational Disease Act. if relevant: 
(i) may be presented to the commission; 
(ii) is not binding; and 
(iii) creates no presumption of an entitlement under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week entitlement, compensation shall be 66-
2/3% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited as follows: 
(aj compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury; 
(b) compensation per week may not be less than the sum of S 45 per week, plus $ 5 for a dependent spouse, plus $ 
5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four dependent minor children, but not ex-
ceeding the maximum established in Subsection (2)(a) nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at the 
time of the injury; and 
(c) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under Subsection (2)(b) shall be 36% of 
the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar. 
(3) This Subsection (3) applies to claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the course of the 
employee's employment on or before June 30, 1994. 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total disability compensa-
tion except as outlined in Section 34A-2-703 as in effect on the date of injury. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any combination of dis-
abilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Part 5, Industrial 
Noise, in excess of the amount of compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total 
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier by the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee. 
(d) After an employee has received compensation from the employee's employer, its insurance carrier, or the Em-
ployers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applica-
ble permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent 
total disability compensation. 
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its insurance car-
rier has satisfied its liability under this Subsection (3) or Section 34A-2-703. 
(4) This Subsection (4) applies to claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the course of the 
employee's employment on or after July 1, 1994. 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for permanent total disability compensation. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any combination of dis-
abilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Part 5, Industrial 
Noise, in excess of the amount of compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total 
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be recouped by the employer or its insurance carrier by reasona-
bly offsetting the overpayment against future liability paid before or after the initial 312 weeks. 
(5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the compensation payable by the employer, its 
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, after an employee has received compensation from the employer 
or the employer's insurance carrier for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the 
applicable total disability compensation rate, shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 
50% of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same period. 
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(6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not final, unless otherwise agreed to by the par-
ties, until: 
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment activities undertaken pursuant to Chapter 
8. Utah injured Worker Reemployment Act; 
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the administrative law judge: 
(A) a reemployment plan as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider reasonably designed to return the 
employee to gainful employment; or 
(B) notice that the employer or its insurance carrier will not submit a plan; and 
(iii) the administrative law judge, after notice to the parties, holds a hearing, unless otherwise stipulated, to: 
(A) consider evidence regarding rehabilitation; and 
(B) review any reemployment plan submitted by the employer or its insurance carrier under Subsection 
(6) (a) ( i i ) . 
(b) Before commencing the procedure required by Subsection (6)(a), the administrative law judge shall order: 
(i) the initiation of permanent total disability compensation payments to provide for the employee's subsistence; 
and 
(ii) the payment of any undisputed disability or medical benefits due the employee. 
(c) Notwithstanding Subsection (6)(a), an order for payment of benefits described in Subsection (6)(b) is consid-
ered a final order for purposes of Section 34A-2-212. 
(d) The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given credit for any disability payments made under Subsection 
(6)(b) against its ultimate disability compensation liability under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease 
Act. 
(e) An employer or its insurance carrier may not be ordered to submit a reemployment plan. If the employer or its 
insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan, the plan is subject to Subsections (6)(e)(i) through (iii). 
(i) The plan may include retraining, education, medical and disability compensation benefits, job placement 
services, or incentives calculated to facilitate reemployment funded by the employer or its insurance carrier. 
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable disability compensation to provide for the employee's subsis-
tence during the rehabilitation process. 
(m) The employer or its insurance carrier shall diligently pursue the reemployment plan. The employer's or in-
surance carrier's tailure to diligently pursue the reemployment plan shall be cause for the administrative law judge on 
the administrative law judge's own motion to make a final decision of permanent total disability. 
(f) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not possible, the administrative law 
judge shall order that the employee be paid weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits. 
(7) (a) The period of benefits commences on the date the employee became permanently totally disabled, as deter-
mined by a final order of the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends: 
(i) with the death of the employee; or 
(ii) when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady work. 
(b) An employer or its insurance carrier may provide or locate for a permanently totally disabled employee rea-
sonable, medically appropriate, part-time work in a job earning at least minimum wage provided that employment may 
not be required to the extent that it would disqualify the employee from Social Security disability benefits. 
(c) An employee shall fully cooperate in the placement and employment process and accept the reasonable, medi-
cally appropriate, part-time work. 
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(d) In a consecutive four-week period when an employee's gross income from the work provided under Subsec-
tion (7)(b) exceeds $ 500, the employer or insurance carrier may reduce the employee's permanent total disability com-
pensation by 50% of the employee's income in excess of $ 500. 
(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the employer or its insurance carrier, a permanently totally disabled 
employee may obtain medically appropriate, part-time work subject to the offset provisions contained in Subsection 
(7)(d). 
(f) (i) The commission shall establish rules regarding the part-time work and offset. 
(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under this Subsection (7) is governed by Part 8, Adjudication. 
(g) The employer or its insurance carrier shall have the burden of proof to show that medically appropriate part-
time work is available. 
(h) The administrative law judge may: 
(i) excuse an employee from participation in any job that would require the employee to undertake work ex-
ceeding the employee's medical capacity and residual functional capacity or for good cause; or 
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance carrier to reduce permanent total disability benefits as provided in Sub-
section (7)(d) when reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time employment has been offered but the employee has 
failed to fully cooperate. 
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible but the employee has 
some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent partial disability. 
(9) As determined by an administrative law judge, an employee is not entitled to disability compensation, unless the 
employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or reemployment plan under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupa-
tional Disease Act. The administrative law judge shall dismiss without prejudice the claim for benefits of an employee if 
the administrative law judge finds that the employee fails to fully cooperate, unless the administrative law judge states 
specific findings on the record justifying dismissal with prejudice. 
(10) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both feet, both legs, both 
eyes, or any combination of two such body members constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated ac-
cording to this section. 
(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection (10)(a) is final. 
(11) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may peiiodically reexamine a permanent total disability claim, except 
those based on Subsection (10), for which the insurer or self-insured employer had or has payment responsibility to de-
termine whether the worker remains permanently totally disabled. 
(b) Reexamination may be conducted no more than once every three years after an award is final, unless good 
cause is shown by the employer or its insurance carrier to allow more frequent reexaminations. 
(c) The reexamination may include: 
(i) the review of medical records; 
(ii) employee submission to reasonable medical evaluations; 
(ni) employee submission to reasonable rehabilitation evaluations and retraining efforts; 
(iv) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax Returns; 
(v) employee certification of compliance with Section 34A-2-110; and 
(vi) employee completion of sworn affidavits or questionnaires approved by the division. 
(d) The insurer or self-insured employer shall pay for the cost of a reexamination with appropriate employee re-
imbursement pursuant to rule for reasonable travel allowance and per diem as well as reasonable expert witness fees 
incurred by the employee in supporting the employee's claim for permanent total disability benefits at the time of reex-
amination. 
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(e) If an employee fails to fully coopeiate in the leasonable ^examination of a peimanent total disability finding, 
an adnnnistiative law judge may oidei the suspension of the employee's peimanent total disability benefits until the 
employee coopeiates with the ^examination 
(f) (i) Should the ^examination of a peimanent total disability finding leveal evidence that leasonably laises the 
issue of an employee's continued entitlement to peimanent total disability compensation benefits, an msuier 01 self-
msuied employei may petition the Di\ ision of Adjudication foi a leheanng on that issue The petition shall be accom-
panied b) documentation suppoiling the insuiei's 01 self-insuied employei's belief that the employee is no longei pei-
manently totally disabled 
(u) If the petition undei Subsection (1 l)(f)(i) demonstiates good cause, as detei mined by the Division of Adju-
dication, an ddministiative law judge shall adjudicate the issue at a heaimg 
(in) Evidence oi an employee's paiticipation in medically appiopiiate, pait-time woik may not be the sole basis 
foi teimination of an employee's peimanent total disability entitlement, but the evidence of the employee's paiticipation 
in medically appiopiiate, pait-time woik undei Subsection (7) may be consideied in the ^examination or heaimg with 
othei evidence ielating to the employee's status and condition 
(g) In accoidance with Section 34A-1-309, the administiative law judge may awaid leasonable attorneys fees to 
an attorney letained by an employee to lepiesent the employee's inteiests with lespect to ^examination of the peima-
nent total disability finding, except if the employee does not pievail, the attorneys fees shall be set at $ 1,000 The attoi-
neys fees shall be paid by the employei oi its msuiance cainei in addition to the peimanent total disability compensa-
tion benefits due 
(h) Dining the penod of ^examination oi adjudication if the employee fully coopeiates, each insuiei, self-msuied 
employei, oi the Employeis' Reinsuiance Fund shall continue to pay the peimanent total disability compensation bene-
fits due the employee 
(12) If any piovision of this section, oi the application of any piovision to any peison oi cncumstance, is held inva-
lid the lemaindei of this section shall be given effect without the invalid piovision oi application 
HISTORY: C 19S3, ^ v l - 6 7 , enacted by L 1988, ch 116 ^ 4, 1988 (2nd S S ), ch 12, § 1, 1991, ch 136, § 12, 
1992, ch 53, § 2, 1994, ch 266, § 2, 1995, ch 177, § 2, lenumbeied by L 1996, ch 240, § 156, lenumbeiedby L 
1997, ch 375, § 121,2005, ch 261, § 1 
NOTES: 
REPEALS AND RE ENACTMENTS -Laws 1988, ch 116, § 4 lepeals foimei § 35-1-67, as last amended by Laws 
1985, ch 160, § 1, lelating to peimanent total disability, effective July 1, 1988, and enacts the piesent section 
AMENDMENT NOTES - T h e 2005 amendment, effective May 2, 2005, substituted "Befoie commencing the pioce-
duie lequned by Subsection (6)(a)" foi "Pnoi to the finding becoming final" in Subsection (6)(b), added Subsection 
(6)(c), and made ielated and stylistic changes thioughout the section 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Commencement of benefits 
Detei mination of chaiactei of disability 
Lstoppel 
Evidence 
I inal oidei 
h Hidings 
Injunes 
Aim 
-- Eye 
- Multiple 
Law in effect 
\fa\ imum benefits 
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Odd-lot doctrine. 
Permanent disability. 
- Benefits. 
Prior accidents contributing to disability. 
Proceedings before commission. 
Refusal to submit to operation. 
Review of plan. 
Statute of limitations. 
Total disability. 
-- Question of fact. 
Cited. 
COMMENCEMENT OF BENEFITS. 
It is within the sound discretion of the commission to determine the commencement date of benefits for total perma-
nent disability so long as the determination is supported by substantial evidence and not patently unreasonable. Oman v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 735 P.2d 665 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). But see Heaton v. Second 
Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990), noted under catchhne "Permanent disability - Benefits," below. 
DETERMINATION OF CHARACTER OF DISABILITY. 
Whether an employee is totally disabled or permanently disabled are ultimate matters to be decided by the commis-
sion, as is also amount and time compensation may be awarded upon all the evidence; and upon these ultimate questions 
expert witnesses may not properly express opinions, nor may such opinions relating to loss of bodily function become 
measure of compensable function possessed by an employee prior to his injury. Spencer v. Industrial Comm'n, 87 Utah 
336, 40 P.2d 188, affd, 87 Utah 358, 48 P.2d 1120 (1935). 
Where there had never been a determination by the commission that the injured employee was permanently disabled, 
and where he did not have injuries which entitled him to a conclusive presumption of permanent disability, whether or 
not he was permanently disabled is a question of fact to be decided by the commission on all the evidence after notice to 
and hearing of the parties. Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 109 Utah 553, 168 P.2d 319 (1946). 
ESTOPPEL. 
Although state insurance fund, the insurance carrier, apparently without any decision of the commission, voluntarily 
paid the medical and hospital expenses and $16 per week to applicant for a period of six years from date of accident, 
defendant was not estopped from claiming that applicanl was not totally and permanently disabled. Crow v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 104 Utah 333, 140 P.2d321, 148A.L.R. 316(1943). 
EVIDENCE. 
Commission could not overturn an administrative law judge's decision granting benefits on the sole basis of a voca-
tional evaluation because the report, although admissible in the Commission's proceedings, was hearsay, and a residuum 
of other non-hearsay, legally competent evidence was required to support rehabilitation. Hoskings v. Industrial Comm'n, 
918 P 2d 150 (Utah Ct.^App. 1996). 
FINAL ORDER. 
Because an order to initiate temporary subsistence payments was based on the initial finding, it was not a "final order" 
from which an abstract could have been issued. While § § 34A-1-303 and 34A-2-801 set forth a broad definition of 
what constitutes a final order, § 34A-2-413 excepts an initial finding of permanent total disability from the broad defi-
nition of "final order" by expressly stating that the initial, tentative finding is not final. (But see Subsection (6)(c), added 
in 2005.) Thomas v. Color Country Mgmt., 2004 UT 12, 492 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 84 P.3d 1201. 
Interim order awarding the claimant permanent total disability was not final and appealable because a reemployment 
plan had not been prepared by the employer and considered in accordance with this section. Target Trucking v. Labor 
Comm'n, 2005 UTApp 70, 519 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 108 P.3d 128. 
FINDINGS. 
Finding of commission upon ultimate fact of total and permanent disability, where evidence is conflicting, will not be 
disturbed on appeal. Commission is not bound by opinions of expert witnesses upon such question. Kelly v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 80 Utah 73, 12 P.2d 1112 (1932). 
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Where employee's leg was shorter than other, and he needed crutches to get about, commission's finding that he was 
not totally and permanently disabled was supported by evidence since loss of use of one limb is not a permanent total 
disability. Mijtit v. Industrial Comm'n, 86 Utah 371, 44 P.2d 705 (1935). 
If there is no substantial conflict in the evidence, an award of the commission as and for total and permanent disability 
will be sustained. Caillet v Industrial Comm'n, 90 Utah 8, 58 P.2d 760 (1936). 
Where committee of physicians examined claimant and found 75% disability in one arm and 25% in other, with which 
findings claimant's physician agreed but contended also that claimant was totally and permanently disabled, evidence 
did not compel finding of total permanent disability. Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Utah 493, 73 P.2d J308 (1937). 
Order of the commission denying additional compensation on ground workman had not become totally and perma-
nently disabled since original finding and award for temporary disability was affirmed although medical testimony was 
in conflict; failure to recover within six years after an accident is not conclusive that injury is permanent and total. 
Spencer v. Industrial Comm'n, 97 Utah 140, 91 P.2d 439 (1939). 
Although there was substantial evidence from which the commission could reasonably find that the applicant was not 
totally and permanently disabled, the case was reversed inasmuch as the only commissioner who heard the evidence did 
not participate in the decision. Crow v. Industrial Comm'n, 104 Utah 333, 140 P.2d 321, 148 A.L.R. 316 (1943). 
INJURIES. 
-- ARM. 
Where there was no complete and permanent loss or loss of use of both arms so that claimant would be permanently 
disabled as matter of law, it was for commission to decide from all the facts and circumstances in evidence whether he 
was so disabled. Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Utah 493, 73 P.2d 1308 (1937). 
- EYE. 
Injury to vision of employee from electric flash was not permanent total disability within this section. Moray v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 58 Utah 404, 199 P. 1023 (1921). 
-MULTIPLE. 
A motorman, 64 years old at the time he was injured while uncoupling cars on an underground railroad in a mine, who 
lost his leg and suffered additional injuries including fracture of shoulder blade, dislocation of breastbone-collarbone 
joint, severe internal injuries to the chest and lung, including comminuted fractures of ribs three through seven on right 
side with attending traumatic pneumonia, and injuries to the scrotum and perineum, was entitled to compensation on 
basis of total and permanent disability. United Park City Mines Co. v. Prescott, 15 Utah 2d 410, 393 P.2d 800 (1964). 
LAW IN EFFECT. 
The law in effect when the injury was sustained governs the amount of the award for a permanent total disability. 
Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 109 Utah 553, 168 P.2d 319 (1946). 
An administrative rule promulgated after claimant's industrial accident, but before claimant's application for a hearing 
in the matter, which purports to modify this section by adding a quantitative requirement to the causation of the disabil-
ity analysis when an injured worker has already qualified for Social Security disability benefits, could not be applied 
retroactively. Rather, the board should have applied this section, the law existing at the time of claimant's injury. Abel v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d 367 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
MAXIMUM BENEFITS. 
Plaintiff, who received temporary total disability compensation commencing with the date of his injury and later was 
paid permanent total disability benefits prior to his return to work, was not entitled to maximum compensation for both 
temporary total and permanent partial disability but was entitled only to permanent partial disability benefits subject to 
the limitations set forth in this section. Johnson v Harsco/Heckett, 737 P.2d 986 (Utah 1987). 
ODD-LOT DOCTRINE. 
When an employee demonstrates that he can no longer perform his normal duties as a result of a work-related acci-
dent, and that he cannot be rehabilitated, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that suitable, steady work is avail-
able, considering the age, mental capacity, and education of the employee, in order to preclude a determination of total 
and permanent disability under the odd-lot doctrine. Marshall v. Industrial Comm'n, 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984). 
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For discussion of the odd-lot doctrine, see Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Mgt. & Second Injury Fund, 725 P.2d 
1323 (Utah 1986); Zimmerman v. Industrial Comm'n, 785 P.2d 1127 "(Utah Ct. App. 1989); Smith v. Mity Lite, 939 P.2d 
684 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Employee presented a prima facie case entitling him to permanent total disability benefits under the odd-lot doctrine, 
where the record was replete with evidence that he was unable to perform the normal duties of his occupation, that he 
required the aid of his fellow employees who performed the bulk of his work for him, and that he suffered continual 
pain as a result of his industrial injuries. Peck v. Eimco Process Equip. Co., 748 P.2d 572 (1987). 
For the odd-lot doctrine to apply, the commission must first determine that there is medical causation between the 
petitioner's industrial accident and his now-claimed permanent total disability. Zupon v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d 
960 (Utah Ct.App. 1993). 
PERMANENT DISABILITY. 
If injured employee's earning power is wholly and permanently destroyed, and because of his injuries he is incapable 
of performing remunerative employment, such employee is permanently totally disabled and to make out a case of total 
disability, the employee is not required to show that he is incapacitated from performing any and all kinds of work. He 
is required, however, to put forth an active effort to procure such employment as he is able to perform, for if injured 
employee is not prevented from securing and retaining employment because of his injuries, and if he can perform the 
duties of such employment without pain or suffering and without unduly endangering his health, life, or limb, the em-
ployee is not totally disabled. Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 74 Utah J03, 277 P. 206 (1929). 
An injured employee in not permanently and totally disabled if, by putting forth a reasonable effort, he is able to pre-
pare himself by training or otherwise to secure and retain remunerative employment. Accordingly, a disability which 
may be overcome by a reasonable effort is not permanent, and it is the duty of an injured employee, just as it is the duty 
of every person sustaining an injury, to put forth a reasonable effort to minimize his injury. If, however, that injured 
employee cannot by training or otherwise secure and retain remunerative employment, the injured employee is excused 
from exerting an effort which of necessity must result in failure. Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Utah 141, 287 
P. 931 (1930). 
A moron was regarded as having been permanently and totally disabled where he was rendered unfit to perform man-
ual labor, and because of his mental condition was incapable of learning a trade which would fit him for employment in 
any line of industry. Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Utah 141, 287 P. 931 (1930). 
Where evidence conclusively shows that employee is permanently and totally disabled from either securing or per-
forming work of the general character that he was performing when injured, he by such evidence establishes a prima 
facie case; and in the absence of any showing that he is able to secure and perform work of a special nature not gener-
ally available, he is, as a matter of law, entitled to an award as and for permanent total disability. Caillet v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 90 Utah 8, 58 P.2d 760 (1936). 
Rule that there is permanent and total disability as a matter of law when it appears that applicant for compensation 
cannot secure or perform work of general character he has been doing, and there is no showing that he is able to secure 
and perform work of a special nature not generally available, does not operate where specific compensation for loss of a 
member or function of a member in provided by statute for permanent partial disability. Babick v. Industrial Comm'n, 
91 Utah 581, 65 P.2d 1133 (1937). 
Award on basis of total and permanent disability is justified where workman's injuries precluded his doing any work 
requiring that he walk, stand, or sit for long periods of time, and he was not of sufficient mental training to enable him 
to rehabilitate himself in purely mental work. Carbon Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 92 Utah 410, 68 P.2d 894 (1937). 
-- BENEFITS. 
Employee who was totally and permanently impaired from the time of his injury in 1975 to the time when permanent 
partial payments terminated, when it had been stipulated that referral to the division of vocational rehabilitation was 
unnecessary, was entitled to permanent total benefits on termination of the permanent partial benefits. Heaton v. Second 
Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990). 
PRIOR ACCIDENTS CONTRIBUTING TO DISABILITY. 
Employee who was permanently and totally disabled due to a combination of prior and present accidents was entitled 
to lifetime benefits payable from the special fund provided for in § 35-1-68. McPhie v. Industrial Comm'n, 567 P.2d 
153 (Utah 1977). 
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE COMMISSION. 
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In proceeding before commission, doctors may testify as to amount of functional disability of bodily member of hu-
man being and impairment person would suffer in ordinary and common activities of life, but not as to percentage of 
industrial or economic impairment consequent on loss of certain physical functions unless it is clear they know what 
bodily activities or functions a vocation or work embraces, and they cannot testify as to ultimate question as to whether 
applicant is economically totally disabled. Price v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 Utah 152, 63 P.2d 592 (1937). 
REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO OPERATION. 
Finding of commission that employee was permanently and totally disabled was sustained by evidence, and by refus-
ing to submit to operation employee did not lose his right to compensation where employee had undergone three major 
operations which did not prove successful and there was no definite assurance that another would result differently. 
Standard Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Utah 118, 16 P.2d 926 (1932). 
REVIEW OF PLAN. 
In requiring a "review" of an employer's reemployment plan (see Subsection (6)(a)(iii)), the Legislature intended an 
independent evaluation and approval of the plan. Color Country Mgmt. v. Labor Comm'n, 2001 UT App 370, 38 P.3d 
969. 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
This section governs permanent total disability claims and contains no statute of limitations for such claims; therefore, 
where employee suffered an injury in October of 1961 and notice of injury and claim was properly given and filed in 
accordance with requirements of former § § 35-1-99 and 35-1-100, and employee was found to have suffered perma-
nent partial disability and received 40 weeks of compensation through December of 1964 and payment of medical bill 
through 1966, employee's claim filed in December of 1982 for permanent total disability resulting from the slow dete-
rioration of a condition caused by 1961 injury was timely filed under this section and, under § 35-1-78, commission 
had continuing jurisdiction to award permanent total disability compensation. Mecham v. Industrial Comm'n, 692 P.2d 
783 (Utah 1984). 
TOTAL DISABILITY. 
Although employee is incapacitated from performing the kind of labor required in his former employment, if he is 
able to perform the work of some other employment, he is not totally disabled. Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 74 Utah 103, 277 P. 206(1929). 
If employee suffers an injury which permanently and totally disables him, he is entitled to the compensation provided 
for in the act without regard to his physical or mental condition before he received such injury. Utah Fuel Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 76 Utah 141, 287 P. 931 (1930). 
Workman may be found totally disabled if by reason of the disability resulting from his injury he cannot perform 
work of the general character he was performing when injured or any other work which a man of his capabilities may be 
able to do or learn to do. United Park City Mines Co. v. Prescott, 15 Utah 2d 410, 393 P.2d 800 (1964). 
Employee, who was almost 60, with a limited education and an even more limited work background, presented a 
prima facie case of tentative permanent total disability, where he suffered from headaches and dizziness after sustaining 
a skull fracture, and despite his employer's contentions that it offered various jobs to employee, the record was devoid 
of any concrete evidence that he was offered work of the general nature that he had been performing. Hardman v. Salt 
Lake City Fleet Mgt. & Second Injury Fund, 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986). 
- QUESTION OF FACT. 
The question of whether an employee was totally and permanently disabled was one of fact to be decided by the 
commission, upon all of the evidence in the case. Kerans v. Industrial Comm'n, 713 P.2d 49 (Utah 1985). 
CITED in Booms v. Rapp Const/: Co., 720 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1986); American Roofing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 752 
P.2d 912 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Large v. Industrial Comm'n, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Ortiz v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 766 P.2d 1092 (Ct. App 1989). 
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Case Nos. 97576,991213,991214,20011070,20011071,20011072,20011073, and 2002595 
JOHNNY ALBERT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT 
and/or WORKERS COMPENSATION 
FUND; QUALITY PLATING and/or 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND; 
BARNARD & BURK GROUP, INC. 
and/or NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS.; 
AMERITEMPS, INC. and/or 
HARTFORD INS.; TRANSWEST 
CONSTRUCTION; UNINSURED 
EMPLOYERS' FUND; EMPLOYERS' 
REINSURANCE FUND, 
Respondents, 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER 
Judge: Richard M. La Jeunesse 
HEARING: Room 334, Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
on December 17, 2002 at 08:30 a.m. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order 
and Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Richard M. La Jeunesse, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The petitioner, Johnny Albert, was present and represented by his attorney 
Richard Burke. 
The respondents, Quality Plating and Workers Compensation Fund 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as Quality), were represented by 
attorney Elliott K. Morris. 
The respondents, American Asbestos Abatement and Workers 
Compensation Fund (hereinafter collectively referred to as American 
Asbestos), were represented by attorney Floyd W. Holm. 
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The respondents, Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and National Union Fire 
Ins. (hereinafter collectively referred to as Barnard & Burk), were 
represented by attorney Carrie Taylor. 
The respondents, Ameritemps, Inc. and Hartford Ins. (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as Ameritemps), were represented by attorney 
Theodore E. Kanell. 
The respondents, Uninsured Employers' Fund and Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund (hereinafter referred to as UEF and ERF respectively), 
were represented by attorney Sherrie Hayashi. 
The respondent, Transwest Construction (hereinafter Transwest), was a 
defunct corporation and did not appear at the hearing. However, the 
Uninsured Employers" Fund defended the issues that involved Transwest 
at the hearing. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
A. Claims against Quality Plating and Workers Compensation Fund in 
Case Nos. 91000124 and 20011070. 
Johnny Albert filed two "Applications For Hearing" with the Utah Labor Commission against 
Quality. Mr. Albert filed his first "Application for Hearing" against Quality on January 24, 1991 
(Case No. 91000124), and claimed entitlement to the payment of medical expenses associated 
with an industrial accident he suffered at Quality on June 18,1990. On July 2, 1991 Judge 
Timothy Allen entered an Order (hereinafter the 1991 Order) that resolved the issues raised in 
Case No. 91000124. 
Mr. Albert filed his second "Application For Hearing" against Quality on October 3, 2001 (Case 
No. 20011070), and claimed entitlement to the following workers' compensation benefits: (1) 
medical expenses; (2) temporary total disability compensation, and; (3) permanent partial 
disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits in Case No. 
20011070 arose out of the same industrial accident with Quality that occurred on June 18, 1990. 
On May 21, 2002 Mr. Albert filed an "Amended Application for Hearing" in Case No. 20011070 
to include a claim for permanent total disability. Mr. Albert's claims against Quality in Case No. 
20011070 are the claims currently under consideration in the present matter. 
00496 
Albert v. American Asbestos Abatement et al 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
page 3 
B. Claims Against American Asbestos Abatement and Workers 
Compensation Fund in Case Nos. 93895,97576, 991214, and 
20011072. 
Mr. Albert filed four "Applications For Hearing" with the Utah Labor Commission against 
American Asbestos. Mr. Albert filed his first "Application for Hearing" against American 
Asbestos" on July 15, 1993 (Case No. 93895), and claimed entitlement to: (1) medical expenses; 
(2) recommended medical care; (3) temporary total disability compensation, and; (4) permanent 
partial disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits against 
American Asbestos arose out of an industrial accident that occurred on July 28,1991. On 
February 4,1994 Judge Benjamin Sims entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
(hereinafter the 1994 Order) that resolved the issues raised in Case No. 93895. 
Mr. Albert filed his second "Application For Hearing" against American Asbestos on July 15, 
1997 (Case No. 97576), and claimed entitlement to the following workers' compensation 
benefits: (1) medical expenses; (2) recommended medical care, and; (3) permanent partial 
disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits in Case No. 
97576 arose out of the same industrial accident with American Asbestos that occurred on July 
28,1991. 
Mr. Albert filed his third "Application For Hearing" against American Asbestos on December 
22,1999 (Case No. 991214), and claimed entitlement to the following workers' compensation 
benefits: (1) medical expenses; (2) recommended medical care, and; (3) permanent partial 
disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits in Case No. 
991214 again arose out of the same industrial accident with American Asbestos that occurred on 
July 28, 1991. 
Mr. Albert filed his fourth "Application For Hearing" against American Asbestos on October 3, 
2001 (Case No. 20011072), and claimed entitlement to the following workers' compensation 
benefits: (1) medical expenses; (2) temporary total disability compensation, and; (3) permanent 
partial disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits in Case 
No. 20011072 also arose out of the same industrial accident with American Asbestos that 
occurred on July 28, 1991. 
On May 21, 2002 Mr. Albert filed an "Amended Application for Hearing" in Case Nos. 97576, 
991214, and 20011072 to include a claim for permanent total disability. Mr. Albert's claims 
against American Asbestos in Case Nos. 97576, 991214, and 20011072 are the claims currently 
under consideration in the present matter. 
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C. Claims against Ameritemps, Inc. and Hartford Ins. in Case Nos. 
991213 and 20011073. 
Mr. Albert filed two "Applications For Hearing" with the Utah Labor Commission against 
Ameritemps. Mr. Albert filed his first "Application for Hearing" against Ameritemps on 
December 22,1999 (Case No. 991213), and claimed entitlement to the payment of medical 
expenses together with recommended medical care related to an industrial accident he suffered at 
Ameritemps on June 16,1997. 
Mr. Albert filed his second "Application For Hearing" against Ameritemps on October 3, 2001 
(Case No. 20011073), and claimed entitlement to the following workers' compensation benefits: 
(1) medical expenses; (2) temporary total disability compensation, and; (3) permanent partial 
disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits in Case No. 
20011073 arose out of the same industrial accident with Quality that occurred on June 16,1997. 
On May 21, 2002 Mr. Albert filed an "Amended Application for Hearing" in Case Nos. 991213 
and 20011073 to include a claim for permanent total disability. Mr. Albert's claims against 
Ameritemps in Case Nos. 991213 and 20011073 are the claims currently under consideration in 
the present matter. 
D. Claims agamst Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. National Union Fire Ins. 
in Case No. 20011071. 
Mr. Albert filed one "Application For Hearing" against Barnard & Burk with the Utah Labor 
Commission on October 3, 2001 (Case No. 20011071). Mr. Albert claimed entitlement lo the 
following workers' compensation benefits: (1) medical expenses; (2) temporary total disability 
compensation, and; (3) permanent partial disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for 
workers' compensation benefits in Case No. 20011071 arose out of an industrial accident that 
occurred while employed by Barnard & Burk on January 1, 1991. 
On May 21, 2002 Mr. Albert filed an "Amended Application for Hearing" in Case No. 20011071 
to include a claim for permanent total disability. Mr. Albert's claims against Barnard & Burk in 
Case No. 20011071 remained under consideration in the present matter. 
E. Claims against Transwest Construction and Uninsured Employers' 
Fund in Case No. 2002595. 
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Mr. Albert filed one "Application For Hearing" against Transwest with the Utah Labor 
Commission on May 21, 2002 (Case No. 2002595). Mr. Albert claimed entitlement to 
permanent total disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits 
in Case No. 2002595 arose out of an industrial accident that occurred while employed by 
Transwest on November 4, 1982. 
F. Position of the Respondents. 
The respondents conceded that Mr. Albert was permanently and totally disabled. However, each 
of the respondents alleged that an injury other than the one respectively defended by the 
individual respondents directly caused Mr. Albert's permanent total disability. Quality Plating 
also claimed that the industrial accident of June 8, 1990 came up short as the legal cause of Mr. 
Albert's back problems. 
G. The Hearing on December 17,2002. 
At the conclusion of the hearing on December 17, 2002,1 agreed to leave the evidentiary record 
open 30 days for the receipt of some additional medical records. On January 14, 2003 I received 
the anticipated medical records and closed the evidentiary record. 
II. ISSUES. 
1. What is the direct cause of Johnny Albert's permanent total disability? 
2. Which of the respondents, if any, owe Johnny Albert permanent total disability 
compensation? 
III. FINDINGS OF FACT 
A. Employment and Compensation Rates. 
1. Transwest Construction. 
No dispute existed that Transwest employed Mr. Albert on November 4, 1982. At the time of 
the November 4, 1982 industrial accident at Transwest, Mr. Albert was not married and had no 
dependent children. 
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Mr. Albert listed on his "Application for Hearing" against Transwest a wage rate of $9.00 per 
hour, and a 40 hour per workweek average. At the hearing Mr. Albert testified that he earned 
$8.00 per hour from Transwest, and worked a 40 hour week on average. When confronted with 
the wage rate set forth on the Employers' First Report of Injury in Exhibit "6," Mr. Albert 
conceded he probably earned $4.00 per hour and worked 40 hours per week on average. 
The preponderance of the more credible evidence in this case established that at the time of his 
industrial accident with Transwest on November 4, 1982, Mr. Albert earned $4.00 per hour and 
worked 40 hours per week on average. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's appropriate workers' 
compensation rate with Transwest equaled $107.00 per week. [$4.00/hour x 40 hours/week = 
$160.00/week x 2/3 = $107.00/week]. 
2. Quality Plating. 
No dispute existed that Quality employed Mr. Albert on June 18,1990. At the time of the June 
18,1990 industrial accident at Quality, Mr. Albert was not married, but had one dependent child. 
In Case No. 20011070 involving Quality, Mr. Albert listed on his "Application for Hearing" a 
wage rate of $5.50 per hour together with a 40 hour per workweek average. At the hearing Mr. 
Albert testified that he earned $9.00 per hour from Quality, and worked a 40 hour week on 
average. Exhibit "7," The Employers' First Report of Injury filed by Quality with respect to the 
June 18, 1990 industrial accident, listed a wage rate for Mr. Albert of $5.50 per hour. 
The preponderance of the more credible evidence in this case established that at the time of his 
industrial accident with Quality on June 18, 1990, Mr. Albert earned $5.50 per hour and worked 
40 hours per week on average. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's appropriate workers' compensation 
rate with Quality equaled $152.00 per week. [$5.50/hour x 40 hours/week = $220.00/week x 2/3 
= $146.66/week + 5.00/week (dependent's allowance) = $152.00/week (rounded to nearest whole 
dollar)]. 
3. Barnard & Burk. 
No dispute existed that Barnard & Burk employed Mr. Albert on January 21, 1991. At the time 
of the January 21,1991 industrial accident at Barnard & Burk, Mr. Albert was not married, but 
had one dependent child. 
Mr. Albert's testimony at the hearing on December 17, 2002 provided the unrefuted evidence 
concerning his wage rate with Barnard & Burk on January 21,1991. Mr. Albert earned an 
average weekly wage of $473.20 from Barnard & Burk. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's appropriate 
temporary total disability compensation rate equaled $320.00 per week. [$473.20 x 
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2/3 = 315.46/week + $5.00/week (dependent's allowance) = $320.00 rounded to the nearest 
whole dollar)]. The maximum permanent partial disability compensation rate as of January 21, 
1991 equaled $243.00 per week. The maximum permanent total disability compensation rate as 
of January 21, 1991 equaled $309.00 per week. 
4. American Asbestos Abatement 
Judge Sims in his February 4, 1994 Order determined the appropriate workers' compensation 
rates for Mr. Albert's July 28, 1991 industrial accident with American Asbestos. Judge Sims 
concluded that Mr. Albert's weekly wage rate equaled $510.20 per week as of July 28,1991 
[1994 Order at p. 3], which yielded: (1) a temporary total disability compensation rate of $345.00 
per week [id. at p. 5]; (2) a permanent partial disability compensation rate of $252.00 per week 
[id. at p. 6], and; (3) a permanent total disability compensation rate of $252.00 per week. I 
adopted the findings and conclusions of the 1984 Order insofar as consistent with the present 
Order. 
5. Ameritemps, Inc. 
No dispute existed that Ameritemps employed Mr. Albert on June 16,1997. At the time of the 
June 16, 1997 industrial accident at Ameritemps, Mr. Albert was not married, but had two 
dependent children. 
Mr. Albert provided four different wage rates with respect to his employment at Ameritemps. In 
Case No. 991213 involving Ameritemps, Mr. Albert listed on his "Application for Hearing" a 
wage rate of $9.00 per hour together with a 50 hour per workweek average. In case No. 
20011073 against Ameritemps, Mr. Albert set forth in his "Application for Hearing" a wage rate 
of $8.00 per hour, and a 32 hour per workweek average. In his "Amended Application for 
Hearing" filed in Case No. 20011073 Mr. Albert claimed his appropriate temporary total 
disability compensation rate should equal $292.33 per week consistent with a "Compensation 
Agreement" between Mr. Albert and Ameritemps executed on March 29, 1999. At the hearing 
Mr. Albert testified that he earned $9.00 per hour from Ameritemps, and worked a 40 hour week 
on average. 
Ameritemps introduced into evidence Exhibit "2," a payroll history of Mr. Albert with 
Ameritemps from May 17, 1997, to June 21, 1997. Exhibit "2" set forth precise information 
concerning Mr. Albert's wages in the five weeks leading up to his industrial accident on June 16, 
1997: 
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Pay Day 
May 17,1997 
May 24,1997 
May 31,1997 
June 7,1997 
June 14,1997 
Total 
Weekly Gross Pay 
$399.20 
$262.40 
$370.40 
$400.16 
$290.40 
$1,722.561 
The best evidence in this case concerning Mr. Albert's average weekly wage with Ameritemps at 
the time of his industrial accident on June 16,1997 came from his actual payroll history 
contained in Exhibit "2." The preponderance of the more credible evidence in this case 
established that Mr. Albert's weekly wage with Ameritemps at the time of his industrial accident 
on June 16,1997 averaged $344.51. [$1,722.56 - 5 weeks = $344.51/week]. Accordingly, Mr. 
Albert's appropriate workers' compensation rate with Ameritemps equaled $240.00 per week. 
[$344.51/week x 2/3 = $229.67/week + 10.00/week (dependents' allowance) = $240.00/week 
(rounded to nearest whole dollar)]. 
B. The Respective Industrial Accidents and Consequent Injuries. 
1. The November 4,1982 Industrial Accident with Transwest 
Construction Case No. 2002595. 
The essential facts of Mr. Albert's November 4, 1982 industrial accident at Transwest stood 
undisputed by the parties. On November 4, 1982 Mr. Albert worked at Transwest building 
trusses. A stack of the trusses fell over on his low back. Mr. Albert pushed himself out from 
under the trusses. 
Mr. Albert remained off of work with low back pain for one week following the November 4, 
1982 industrial accident at Transwest. Mr. Albert claimed that between 1982, and 1990, he 
sustained no further injuries to his low back. 
11 did not factor in the last check received by Mr. Albert on June 21, 1997, because his 
industrial accident occurred on June 16,1997 affecting the number of hours he worked that 
week. 
00502 
Albert v. American Asbestos Abatement et al 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
page 9 
a. Injuries Caused by the November 4,1982 Industrial Accident 
at Transwest Construction. 
The parties concurred that no contemporaneous medical records could be located with respect to 
the injuries caused by Mr. Albert's November 4, 1982 industrial accident. Of the many medical 
opinions in this case, only Dr. Joel Dall M.D. and Dr. Scott Knorp M.D. addressed Mr. Albert's 
low back problems in connection with the November 4,1982 industrial accident at Transwest. 
On August 15, 2002 Dr. Dall diagnosed Mr. Albert with "Chronic low back pain, 
multifactoral...." [Exhibit "J-l" at 113]. Dr. Dall rated Mr. Albert's low back condition: 
[c]omplaints of low back pain .... [b]ased on his description and my examination 
today, I feel he would best fall into Category 1C (see page 16 in Utah's 2002 
Impairment Guides) which is awarded five percent whole person impairment, [id. 
at 115]. 
Dr. Dall determined that: 
[b]ased on the fact that he lost no time from work I would apportion 0 percent of 
his back injury to the incident at Tram Core2 on 11-18-19823." [id.]. 
On November 25,2002 Dr. Knorp also diagnosed Mr. Albert with "Nonspecific subjective low 
back pain...." [id. at 21]. Dr. Knorp commented concerning a rating for Mr. Albert's low back 
condition: 
Quite frankly, it is my best medical judgment that there is no objective medical 
evidence, and certainly no consistent or reliable historical information to support 
any ratable impairment offered on behalf of Mr. Albert with respect to his spinal 
complaints, [id. at26].4 
2
 Actually Transwest. 
3
 As determined supra Mr. Albert's industrial accident at Transwest in fact occurred on 
November 4, 1982. 
4
 Dr. Knorp in another portion of his opinion seemed to hedge his bets with a facetious 
3% whole person impairment rating postulated by cynically disregarding all of what Dr. Knorp 
deemed valid objective medical and historical evidence, [id. at 26]. Accordingly, I gave no 
consideration to Dr. Knorp's ironic 3% impairment rating. 
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The preponderance of the more credible evidence in this case supported the opinion rendered by 
Dr. Dall that Mr. Albert suffered from chronic low back pain, which resulted in a 5% whole 
person impairment.5 The medical record in this case contained a consistent chronology of 
treatment for back pain suffered by Mr. Albert over a span of years, [see gen: id. at pp. 147-148, 
150, 254-258, 260-300, 302, 310-318]. However, Dr. Dall apportioned none of Mr. Albert's 5% 
permanent partial impairment to his industrial accident of November 4, 1982. Therefore, while 
Mr. Albert suffered from chronic back pain that resulted in a 5% whole person impairment, none 
of his rated low back problems derived from the remote November 1982 industrial accident at 
Transwest. 
b. Workers' Compensation Benefits Owed by Transwest 
Construction and/or Uninsured Employers5 Fund as a Result 
of Johnny Albert's November 4,1982 Industrial Accident 
Mr. Albert's single "Application for Hearing" against Transwest and UEF as represented in Case 
No. 2002595 claimed only permanent total disability compensation. As set forth in Section 
IILC.l .a. supra Mr. Albert suffered no permanent impairment from his November 4,1982 
industrial accident with Transwest. Consequently, Mr. Albert's November 4, 1982 industrial 
accident could not have caused his permanent total disability. Therefore, Mr. Albert's claim 
against Transwest and UEF for permanent total disability compensation must be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
2. The June 18,1990 Industrial Accident with Quality Plating Case No. 
20011070. 
a. Injuries Caused by the June 18,1990 Industrial Accident at 
Quality Plating. 
No dispute existed concerning the essential facts of Mr. Albert's industrial accident at Quality. 
On June 18, 1990 Mr. Albert picked up a stack of metal plates that weighed 30 to 40 pounds, and 
put them on a table. While he lifted the plates Mr. Albert felt his low back pop. Mr. Albert 
remained off work for one week and treated with a chiropractor for his low back problems 
sustained in the June 18,1990 industrial accident. Dr. Dall apportioned half of Mr. Albert's 5% 
whole person impairment from his chronic low back pain to the June 18, 1990 incident. 
5
 Utah Administrative Code R. 602-2-2.A.2. requires that a medical controversy over an 
impairment rating over 5% be sent to a medical panel for consideration. In the present matter the 
discrepancy between Dr. Knorp's 0% impairment rating and Dr. Dall's 5% whole person 
impairment rating did not exceed 5%. Therefore no necessity existed for the referral of this issue 
to a medical panel. 
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b. The Issue of Legal Causation as Applied to Johnny Albert's 
June 18,1990 Industrial Accident. 
On June 18, 1990 Mr. Albert lifted a stack of steel plates that weighed 30 to 40 pounds and put 
them on a table. Mr. Albert felt his low back pop. Mr. Albert went to Dr. Theodore Conger D.C. 
for treatment of his low back. [id. at 289]. Dr. Conger filed a "Physician's Initial report of Work 
Injury" on June 23,1990. [id.]. 
Quality argued that Mr. Albert could not establish legal causation between his industrial accident 
on June 18,1990, and the low back problems he complained of thereafter. As set forth in 
Section HLC.l.a. no contemporary records existed that documented the nature of Mr. Albert's 
low back injury on November 4, 1982. Further, Dr. Dall apportioned none of Mr. Albert's 
ratable low back impairment to the November 4,1982 industrial accident. Finally, no medical 
records existed that showed Mr. Albert suffered from any ongoing low back problems between 
his accident on November 4, 1982, and the accident of June 18, 1990. In short, Quality failed to 
establish that Mr. Albert suffered from preexisting low back problems of the nature and kind he 
sustained on June 18,1990. Therefore, Mr. Albert had no need to jump the higher legal 
causation hurdle enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 
P. 2d 15, 24-25 (Utah 1986). 
c. Temporary Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a 
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident. 
Mr. Albert remained off work from Quality six days from June 19,1990, to June 25, 1990, when 
Dr. Conger released him back to work. [Exhibit "J-l" at 289]. Consequently, Qaulity and/or 
WCF owed Mr. Albert $65.36 in temporary total disability compensation for the six days, minus 
three, he missed work due to the June 18,1990 industrial accident at Quality.6 [$152.00/week x 
$.43 weeks (three days) = $65.36]. 
d. Permanent Partial Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a 
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident. 
6
 Utah Code §34A-2-408, formerly Utah Code §35-1-64, does not allow temporary total 
disability compensation for the first three days of the disability unless the disability lasts more 
than 14 days. 
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Dr. Dall apportioned half of Mr. Albert's 5% whole person impairment due to chronic low back 
pain to the June 18, 1990 industrial accident at Quality. [Exhibit "J-l" at 115]. As set forth in 
Section DLC.l.a. the preponderance of the evidence in this case favored the opinion of Dr. Dall 
as to Mr. Albert's low back impairment. Therefore, Quality and/or WCF owed Mr. Albert 
$1,185.60 in permanent partial disability compensation for a 2/4 % whole person impairment 
caused by the June 18, 1990 industrial accident. [$152.00/week x 312 weeks x 0.025 = 
$1,185.60]. 
e. Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a 
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident. 
For the reasons set forth in Section HLC.2. infra the injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the June 
18,1990 did not constitute the direct cause of his permanent total disability. Therefore, Quality 
and WCF did not owe Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation. 
3. The January 21,1991 Industrial Accident with Barnard & Burk 
Group, Inc. Case No- 20011071. 
a. Injuries Caused by the January 21,1991 Industrial Accident at 
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. 
The essential facts of Mr. Albert's January 21, 1991 industrial accident at Barnard & Burk came 
in undisputed. On January 21, 1991 Mr. Albert worked for Barnard & Burk removing asbestos 
at the Chevron Refinery. Mr. Albert slipped, fell, and landed on a pipe with his low back. Mr. 
Albert described his low back as "all messed up" and went to a chiropractor for treatment. On 
January 22, 1991 Dr. Conger filed a "Physician's Initial report of Work Injury" with respect to 
Mr. Albert's January 21, 1991 industrial accident with Barnard & Burk. [id. at 260]. 
b. Temporary Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins, 
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial 
Accident. 
At the hearing, Mr. Albert did not identify any periods of time he missed work due to the January 
21, 2001 industrial accident at Barnard & Burk. Accordingly, Barnard & Burk owed Mr. Albert 
no temporary total disability as a result of the January 21, 1991 industrial accident. 
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c. Permanent Partial Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins. 
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial 
Accident. 
Dr. Dall apportioned half of Mr. Albert's 5% whole person impairment due to chronic low back 
pain to the January 21,1991 industrial accident at Barnard & Burk. [id. at 115]. As set forth in 
Section HLC.l.a. the preponderance of the evidence in this case favored the opinion of Dr. Dall 
as to Mr. Albert's low back impairment. Therefore, Barnard & Burk and National Union owed 
Mr. Albert $1,895.40 in permanent partial disability compensation consequent to the January 21, 
2001 industrial accident. [$243.00/week x 312 weeks x 0.025 = $1,895.40]. 
d. Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins. 
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial 
Accident. 
For the reasons set forth in Section IILC.2. infra the injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the 
January 21, 2001 industrial accident did not constitute the direct cause of his permanent total 
disability. Therefore, Barnard & Burk and National Union did not owe Mr. Albert permanent 
total disability compensation. 
4. The July 28,1991 Industrial Accident with American Asbestos 
Abatement Case Nos. 97576,991214, and 20011072. 
a. Injuries Caused by the July 28,1991 Industrial Accident at 
American Asbestos Abatement. 
No dispute existed concerning the facts of Mr. Albert's July 28,1991 industrial accident. On 
July 28, 1991 Mr. Albert worked for American Asbestos at Hill Air Force Base. Mr. Albert fell 
more than twenty feet from a scaffold and landed primarily on his right foot. 
On July 30,1991 Dr. Kenneth Jee M.D. diagnosed Mr. Albert with a: "right comminuted 
calcaneus7 fracture." [id. at 377]. Also on July 30, 2001 Dr. Jee operated on Mr. Albert and 
performed a: 
Closed reduction with percutaneous pin manipulation and fixation right 
comminuted calcaneus fracture, [id.]. 
7
 Largest of the tarsal bones that form the heel of the foot. 
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On July 24, 1992 Dr. David Howe M.D. concluded that Mr. Albert still suffered from: 
"Traumatic arthritis subtalar joint right foot." [id. at 367]. Also on July 24, 1992 Dr. Howe 
performed the second operation on Mr. Albert's right foot a: "Subtalar arthrodesis8 with bone 
graft from right illiac crest." On March 17, 1993 Dr. Howe in a third operative procedure on Mr. 
Albert's right foot removed the hardware from the second operation, [id. at 370]. 
Judge Sim's 1994 Order concluded that Mr. Albert's right foot injury caused by his industrial 
accident of July 28, 1991 resulted in a "nine percent whole person impairment." [1994 Order at 
p. 4]. As noted in Section LB. supra, I adopted the findings and conclusions contained in the 
1994 Order insofar as consistent with the present Order. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's right foot 
injury caused by his industrial accident of July 28,1991 resulted in a "nine percent whole person 
impairment." 
b. Temporary Total and Permanent Partial Disability 
Compensation Benefits Owed by American Asbestos 
Abatement and/or Workers Compensation Fund as a Result of 
Johnny Albert's July 28,1991 Industrial Accident 
As set forth in Section LB. supra, the 1994 Order resolved the issues concerning temporary total 
and permanent partial disability compensation owed by American Asbestos and WCF to Mr. 
Albert as a result of the July 28,1991 industrial accident. Mr. Albert did not identify any 
additional periods of temporary total disability, nor any additional permanent partial impairment, 
resultant from the July 28, 1991 industrial accident. Accordingly, American Asbestos and WCF 
owed Mr. Albert no additional temporary total, nor permanent partial, disability compensation 
for the July 21,1991 industrial accident beyond that set forth in the 1994 Order. 
c. Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
American Asbestos Abatement and/or Workers Compensation 
Fund as a Result of Johnny Albert's July 28,1991 Industrial 
Accident 
For the reasons set forth in Section IILC.2. infra the injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the July 
28, 2001 industrial accident did not constitute the direct cause of his permanent total disability. 
Therefore, American Asbestos and WCF did not owe Mr. Albert permanent total disability 
compensation. 
Fusion. 
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5. The June 16,1997 Industrial Accident with Ameritemps, Inc. Case 
Nos. 991213 and 20011073. 
a. Injuries Caused by the June 16,1997 Industrial Accident at 
Ameritemps, Inc. 
Again, no dispute existed concerning the factual circumstances of Mr. Albert's June 16,1997 
industrial accident with Ameritemps. On June 16,1997 Mr. Albert worked for Ameritemps at 
Cisco Foods driving a self-propelled pallet jack. Mr. Albert crushed his left great toe between 
the pallet jack and a steel "I" beam. 
On June 30, 1997 Dr. Stephen Shultz M.D. took an x-ray of Mr. Albert's left foot and 
discovered: 
Significantly angulated fracture of the first proximal phalanx with probable intra-
articular extension. [Exhibit "J-l" at 322]. 
Also on June 30, 1997 Dr. William Burleigh DPM operated on Mr. Albert's left foot, which 
consisted of an: "Open-reduction internal fixation, left hallux.9" [id. at 354-355]. On November 
14,1997 Dr. Burleigh performed a second operation on Mr. Albert's left foot that involved: 
"Arthroplasty hallux left foot." [id. at 342]. 
On March 11, 1998 Dr. Howe diagnosed Mr. Albert with; "Traumatic arthritis to proximate 
interphalangeal joint of left great toe." [id. at 368]. Dr. Howe operated on Mr. Albert's left foot 
for the third surgical procedure: "Left great toe proximal interphalangeal joint fusion with bone 
graft from left tibia." [id.]. 
On July 31,1998 Dr. How determined that Mr. Albert had a: "Failed fusion left great toe 
interphalangeal joint." [id. at 365]. Consequently, Dr. Howe performed the fourth operation on 
Mr. Albert's left foot a repeat: "Fusion of left great toe interphalangeal joint with bone graft from 
left tibia." [id.]. 
On February 25, 1999 Dr. Howe gave Mr. Albert an impairment rating for his left foot injuries 
sustained in the June 16,1997 industrial accident, [id. at 148]. Dr. Howe found: 
9
 Great toe. 
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In trying to find a partial impairment for the great toe of Johnny's left foot I have 
had to go to the American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of 
Permanent Impairment, 3rd Edition. The 4th Edition only talks about the MP joint 
of the great toe, it does not talk about the IP joint of the great toe. From table 24 
on page 56, with the IP joint fused at 0 degrees he deserves a 45% impairment of 
the great toe. Table 27, page 59 of this correlates to an 8% impairment of the foot 
which using table 36 page 65 correlates to a 6% lower extremity impairment 
which according to table 46 page 72 correlates to a 2% whole person impairment, 
[id.]. 
On August 15, 2002 Dr. Joel Dall provided an impairment rating for Mr. Albert's left foot 
injuries sustained in the June 16, 1997 industrial accident, [id. at 115]. Dr. Dall concluded that: 
In regards to the toe injury, the Fifth Edition refers to Table 17-30 for impairment 
due to ankylosis10 in the toes. His great toe is ankylosed in a position of function 
which provides a four percent whole person impairment, [id.]. 
Because Dr. Dall used the more current and applicable Fifth Edition to the American Medical 
Associations Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, I found his impairment rating 
to be better supported than that given by Dr. Howe based on the Third Edition. Accordingly, the 
preponderance of the better supported medical evidence in this case favored the rating supplied 
by Dr. Dall with respect to Mr. Albert's left foot injuries sustained in the June 16,1997 industrial 
accident. Therefore the preponderance of the evidence in this case established that Mr. Albert's 
industrial accident with Ameritemps on June 16, 1997 caused him a 4% whole person 
impairment due to his left foot injury.11 
b. Temporary Total and Permanent Partial Disability 
Compensation Benefits Owed by Ameritemps, Inc. and/or 
Hartford Ins. as a Result of Johnny Albert's June 16,1997 
Industrial Accident. 
10
 Bone fusion. 
11
 Ameritemps questioned Mr. Alberl concerning a number of incidents where Mr. Albert 
sustained trauma to his left great toe after the June 16, 1997 industrial accident. However, no 
medical evidence existed that demonstrated a causal connection between the subsequent 
incidents referred to by Ameritemps and a significant, or ratable, impairment to Mr. Albert's left 
foot other than that caused by his June 16,1997 industrial accident. 
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With the exception of one day at Erickson Construction, Mr. Albert never worked again after the 
June 16, 1997 industrial accident. Ameritemps claimed that it paid Mr. Albert $25,098.00 in 
temporary total disability compensation from June 16, 1997, to February of 1999. Mr. Albert did 
not contradict the assertions of Ameritemps with respect to the payment of temporary total 
disability compensation. Neither party addressed the payment of permanent partial disability 
compensation with respect to Mr. Albert's June 16,1997 industrial accident. Because of the 
resolution of the permanent total disability claim herein, I deferred further consideration of the 
issues concerning temporary total disability compensation and permanent partial disability 
compensation. 
C. Permanent Total Disability Compensation. 
1. Permanent Total Disability. 
As set forth in Section I.F. supra, the respondents conceded that Mr. Albert was permanently and 
totally disabled. However, each of the respondents denied that the respective industrial accident 
associated with that particular respondent caused Mr. Albert's permanent total disability. 
2. The Cause of Johnny Albert's Permanent Total Disability. 
Mr. Albert incurred a 2Vi % whole person impairment as a result of the low back injury he 
sustained on June 18,1990 while employed for Quality Plating, [see: Section IILB.2. supra]. Mr. 
Albert remained off work only one week following his June 18,1990 industrial injury then 
returned to regular employment with Quality Plating, [see: Section IILB.2.a. supra]. 
Mr. Albert also incurred a 2Vi % whole person impairment as a result of the low back injury he 
sustained on January 21, 1991 while employed for Barnard & Burk. [see: Section IH.B.3. supra], 
Mr. Albert did not identify any lost time from work as a result of his January 21, 1991 industrial 
accident, [see: Section III.B.3.b. supra]. 
Mr. Albert's industrial accident with American Asbestos on July 28, 1991 resulted in a 9% whole 
person impairment as a result of injuries to his right foot caused by the accident, [see: Section 
III.BAa. supra]. Because of the injuries cause to Mr. Albert's right foot by his industrial accident 
on July 28, 1991, Dr. Jee stated: 
He should be retrained for an occupation that will not involve prolonged walking 
or standing. Furthermore, he cannot climb up ladders, or heights, due to risk of 
falling. An ideal position would either involve a job at a work bench sitting or a 
desk job. Exhibit "J-1" at 233]. 
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On November 30, 1993 Dr. Howe described Mr. Albert's "Functional Work Capacity" as result 
of his right foot injuries from the July 28, 1991 industrial accident: 
Preclusion from heavy lifting, climbing ladders, working at heights and from 
frequent walking, squatting, kneeling and stair climbing, [id. at 212]. 
Nevertheless, after a lengthy convalescence Mr. Albert sallied forth again into the work force at 
Ameritemps. Mr. Albert's industrial accident with Ameritemps on June 16, 1997 resulted in a 
4% whole person impairment as a result of injuries to his left foot caused by the accident, [see: 
Section IH.B.5.a. supra]. Because of the injuries caused to Mr. Albert's left foot by his industrial 
accident on June 16,1997, Dr. Howe stated: 
Johnny has worked a heavy labor type job. I told him in theory he could return to 
a light duty job, basically a sit-down job. He cannot walk much except to and 
from work, should not be doing any carrying, lifting, etc. [Exhibit "J-l" at 156]. 
Unfortunately, Mr. Albert also suffered from serious psychological problems that caused him 
considerable difficulty in learning new tasks or performing jobs that required any mental acuity. 
After Mr. Albert's industrial accident with American Asbestos on July 28, 1991, Barry Richards 
LCSW noted that: 
At this time Johnny's primary (expressed) symptoms are indicative of a normal 
post-traumatic stress response (survival honey moon), with no apparent major 
PTSD symptoms, [id. at 251]. 
On November 30, 1993 Dr. Richard Knoeble M.D. diagnosed Mr. Albert with "Severe 
Depression." [id. at 212]. On March 30,1994 Ralf Gant PhD. completed a full scale 
psychological assessment of Mr. Albert that revealed: 
Johnny produced ... a full scale IQ Score of 83 placing him, by DSMIII-R 
Standards, in the borderline range of intellectual functioning. 
A review of the WAIS-R psychograph indicates severe deficits in long term 
memory, general verbal knowledge, short term memory and attention, general use 
of the language, arithmetic and concentration, impulse control and judgment and 
abstract and logical thinking, [id, at 195]. 
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Dr. Gant diagnosed Mr. Albert with: "[rjeactive major depression to Johnny's work-related 
injuries and his perceived losses." [id. at 198]. Dr. Gant further noted the causal connection 
between Mr. Albert's industrial injuries and many of his psychological problems when he 
observed that: 
As a consequence of his reactive depression there is marked restriction in his 
activities of daily living. He experiences marked difficulties in maintaining social 
functioning. There are constant deficiencies of concentration. With his 
unresolved physical conditions there is significant deficiency of persistence or 
pace resulting in his inability to complete tasks in a timely manner, particularly in 
a work setting. There has been a continual process of deterioration and 
decompensation since his work injuries, leaving him to withdraw from work. His 
adaptive behavior since his injuries has been very poor. [id.]. 
Dr. Gant concluded with cautious optimism that: 
[w]ith assistance from a rehabilitation program, Johnny could utilize his average 
to high average residual skills. With appropriate intervention Johnny might yet be 
restored to his role as a productive worker, [id.]. 
Mr. Albert attended Vocational Rehabilitation and with all of his physical and psychological 
problems did in fact return to work with Ameritemps until his final industrial accident on June 16, 
1997. However, after Mr. Albert fractured his left great toe on June 16,1997, followed by four 
consequent surgeries, Mr. Albert did not return to work. 
On October 25, 2002 Leslie Cooper PhD. performed another full scale psychological assessment 
of Mr. Albert that disclosed: 
Shiply Institute of Living Scale - Weschsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised Full 
Scale IQ of 75 which falls at the 5th percentile and falls at the Borderline Mentally 
Deficient range of intellectual functioning, [id. at 84]. 
The Beck Depression Inventory-II... His obtained raw score of 29 suggested 
moderate depression, [id. at 85]. 
On October 22, 2002 Dr. David McCann M.D. comprehensively diagnosed Mr. Albert's 
psychological problems as: 
00513 
Albert v. American Asbestos Abatement et al 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
page 20 
Axis I - (Clinical Psychiatric Disorders) 
1. Depressive Disorder.... 
2. Learning Disorder, Reading. 
3. Written Communication Disorder, Spelling. 
4. Cognitive Disorder .... [id. at 41]. 
Axis II - (Personality Disorder or Disordered Personality Traits) 
1. Personality Disorder, not otherwise specified, with Paranoid, 
Borderline, and Antisocial Traits. 
2. Borderline Intellectual Functioning 
ste die die sic die die die die die die die 
Axis V - (Global Assessment of Functioning) 
The patient is not able to understand the complexities of his current 
situation and is significantly out of touch with reality. He exhibits anger 
impairment in work, family relations, judgment, and mood .... [id. at 42]. 
Dr. McCann proceeded to give Mr. Albert the only impairment rating for his psychological 
problems, and apportioned the impairment: 
According to the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of 
Permanent Impairment, Fifth Edition, he has a Class 2 or mild impairment in 
activities of daily functioning: Class 3 or moderate impairment in social 
functioning: Class 3 or moderate impairment in concentration and Class 4 or 
marked impairment in ability to adapt. Using traditional Utah concepts of 
percentages, his overall estimated psychiatric impairment is Class 3 or probably in 
this case about a 30% whole person impairment. 
Of the patient's 30% impairment 10% is caused by his preexisting borderline 
intellectual functioning, 10% is caused by his disordered personality traits and 
lack of ability to conceptualize reality and about 10% is related to his injuries and 
chronic pain.12 [id. at 43]. 
12
 Dr. McCann did not further apportion the 10% psychological impairment caused by 
Mr. Albert's industrial injuries between those respective injuries. 
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In sum, Mr. Albert sustained a 5% whole person impairment from his back injuries caused half 
and half respectively by the June 8, 1990 industrial accident at Quality, and the January 21, 1991 
industrial accident at Barnard & Burk. Mr. Albert incurred a 9% whole person impairment from 
his right foot injuries caused by his July 28, 1991 industrial accident at American Asbestos. Mr. 
Albert sustained a 4% whole person impairment from his left foot injuries caused by his June 16, 
1997 industrial accident with Ameritemps. Finally, Mr. Albert had a 30% whole person 
impairment from psychological problems. Of Mr. Albert's psychological impairment, 20% 
preexisted his industrial accidents, and 10% derived undifferentiated from his industrial injuries. 
Mr. Albert's collective physical and psychological problems left him 48% impaired as to the 
whole person. 
Yet at the end of the day, the preponderance of the evidence in this case revealed that despite the 
legion of medical and psychological impairments accumulated by Mr. Albert during the course 
of his life, he remained able to work until the injury he sustained on June 16,1997 with 
Ameritemps. The fractured great toe on June 16,1997, with the subsequent four surgeries and 
4% whole person permanent impairment, proved to be the proverbial straw that broke the 
camel's back. Mr. Albert never returned to work after the June 16,1997 industrial accident, and 
thereafter by consensus remained permanently and totally disabled. Hence, the preponderance of 
the evidence in this case established that Mr. Albert's industrial accident of June 16,1997 acted 
as the direct cause of his permanent total disability. 
3, Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Ameritemps, Inc. and Hartford Ins. as a Result of Johnny Albert's 
June 16,1997 Industrial Accident. 
Mr. Albert's industrial accident of June 16, 1997 directly caused his permanent total disability, 
[see: Section III.C.2.supra]. Mr. Albert never worked again after his industrial accident on June 
16,1997. The preponderance of the evidence in this case confirmed that Mr. Albert became 
permanently and totally disabled on June 16, 1997. Therefore, Ameritemps and Hartford owed 
Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation at the rate of $240.00 per week from June 16, 
1997, to June 17, 2003. After June 17, 2003, Ameritemps and Hartford owed Mr. Albert on an 
ongoing basis permanent total disability compensation at the rate of $240.00 less 50% of any 
Social Security retirement benefits received by Mr. Albert during the same period. Ameritemps 
and Hartford are additionally entitled to an offset for any amounts of temporary total, or 
permanent partial, disability compensation paid to Mr. Albert for any time period that they also 
owed Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. Employment and Compensation Rates. 
1. Transwest Construction. 
Transwest employed Mr. Albert on November 4,1982. At the time of the November 4,1982 
industrial accident at Transwest, Mr. Albert was not married and had no dependent children. 
At the time of his industrial accident with Transwest on November 4,1982, Mr. Albert earned 
$4.00 per hour, and worked 40 hours per week on average. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's 
appropriate workers' compensation rate with Transwest equaled $107.00 per week. [$4.00/hour x 
40 hours/week = $160.00/week x 2/3 = $107.00/week]. 
2. Quality Plating. 
Quality employed Mr. Albert on June 18,1990. At the time of the June 18,1990 industrial 
accident at Quality, Mr. Albert was not married, but had one dependent child. 
At the time of his industrial accident with Quality on June 18,1990, Mr. Albert earned $5.50 per 
hour, and worked 40 hours per week on average. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's appropriate 
workers' compensation rate with Quality equaled $152.00 per week. [$5.50/hour x 40 
hours/week = $220.00/week x 2/3 = $146.66/week + 5.00/week (dependent's allowance) = 
$152.00/week (rounded to nearest whole dollar)]. 
3. Barnard & Burk. 
Barnard & Burk employed Mr. Albert on January 21, 1991. At the time of the January 21, 1991 
industrial accident at Barnard & Burk, Mr. Albert was not married, but had one dependent child. 
Mr. Albert earned an average weekly wage of $473.20 from Barnard & Burk. Accordingly, Mr. 
Albert's appropriate temporary total disability compensation rate equaled $320.00 per week. 
[$473.20 x 2/3 = 315.46/week + $5.00/week (dependent's allowance) = $320.00 rounded to the 
nearest whole dollar)]. The maximum permanent partial disability compensation rate as of 
January 21, 1991 equaled $243.00 per week. The maximum permanent total disability 
compensation rate as of January 21, 1991 equaled $309.00 per week. 
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4. American Asbestos Abatement. 
Mr. Albert's weekly wage rate with American Asbestos equaled $510.20 per week as of July 28, 
1991, which yielded: (1) a temporary total disability compensation rate of $345.00 per week; (2) 
a permanent partial disability compensation rate of $252.00 per week, and; (3) a permanent total 
disability compensation rate of $252.00 per week. 
5. Ameritemps, Inc. 
Ameritemps employed Mr. Albert on June 16,1997. At the time of the June 16,1997 industrial 
accident at Ameritemps, Mr. Albert was not married, but had two dependent children. 
Mr. Albert's weekly wage with Ameritemps at the time of his industrial accident on June 16, 
1997 averaged $344.51. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's appropriate workers' compensation rate with 
Ameritemps equaled $240.00 per week. [ $344.51/week x 2/3 = $229.67/week + 10.00/week 
(dependents' allowance) = $240.00/week (rounded to nearest whole dollar)]. 
B. The Respective Industrial Accidents and Consequent Injuries. 
1. The November 4,1982 Industrial Accident with Transwest 
Construction Case No. 2002595. 
On November 4,1982 Mr. Albert worked at Transwest building trusses. A stack of the trusses 
fell over on his low back. Mr. Albert remained off of work with low back pain for one week 
following the November 4,1982 industrial accident at Transwest. Between 1982, and 1990, Mr. 
Albert sustained no further injuries to his low back. 
a. Injuries Caused by the November 4,1982 Industrial Accident 
at Transwest Construction. 
Mr. Albert suffered from chronic low back pain, which resulted in a 5% whole person 
impairment. While Mr. Albert suffered from chronic back pain that resulted in a 5% whole 
person impairment, none of his rated low back problems derived from the remote November 
1982 industrial accident at Transwest. 
b. Workers' Compensation Benefits Owed by Transwest 
Construction and/or Uninsured Employers' Fund as a Result 
of Johnny Albert's November 4,1982 Industrial Accident. 
00517 
Albert v. American Asbestos Abatement et al 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
page 24 
Mr. Albert's single "Application for Hearing" against Transwest and UEF as represented in Case 
No. 2002595 claimed only permanent total disability compensation. Mr. Albert suffered no 
permanent impairment from his November 4, 1982 industrial accident with Transwest. 
Consequently, Mr. Albert's November 4,1982 industrial accident could not have caused his 
permanent total disability. Therefore, Mr. Albert's claim against Transwest and UEF for 
permanent total disability compensation must be dismissed with prejudice. 
2. The June 18,1990 Industrial Accident with Quality Plating Case No. 
20011070. 
a. Injuries Caused by the June 18,1990 Industrial Accident at 
Quality Plating. 
On June 18,1990 Mr. Albert picked up a stack of metal plates that weighed 30 to 40 pounds, and 
put them on a table. While he lifted the plates Mr. Albert felt his low back pop. Mr. Albert 
remained off work for one week and treated with a chiropractor for his low back problems 
sustained in the June 18,1990 industrial accident. 
b. The Issue of Legal Causation as Applied to Johnny Albert's 
June 18,1990 Industrial Accident. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that: 
The language "arising out of or in the course of his employment"... was apparently 
intended to ensure that compensation is only awarded where there is sufficient 
causal connection between the disability and the working conditions. The 
causation requirement makes it necessary to distinguish those injuries which (a) 
coincidentally occur at work because a preexisting condition results in symptoms 
which appear during work hours without any enhancement from the workplace, 
and (b) those injuries which occur because some condition or exertion required by 
the employment increases the risk of injury which the worker normally faces in 
his everyday life. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d 15, 24-25 
(Utah 1986). 
The Court in Allen then adopted an analysis that involved a two part causation test to establish 
both legal causation and medical causation. Id. at 25. With respect to legal causation the Court in 
Allen held that: 
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To meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant with a preexisting condition 
must show that the employment contributed something substantial to increase the 
risk he already faced in everyday life because of his condition. This additional 
element of risk in the workplace is usually supplied by an exertion greater than 
that undertaken in normal everyday life. This extra exertion serves to offset the 
preexisting condition of the employee as a likely cause of the injury, thereby 
eliminating claims for impairments resulting from a personal risk rather than 
exertions at work. 
Thus, where the claimant suffers from a preexisting condition which contributes 
to the injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion is required to prove legal 
causation. Where there is no preexisting condition, a usual or ordinary exertion is 
sufficient. Id. at 25-26. 
On June 18,1990 Mr. Albert lifted a stack of steel plates that weighed 30 to 40 pounds and put 
them on a table. Mr. Albert felt his low back pop. Quality argued that Mr. Albert could not 
establish legal causation between his industrial accident on June 18,1990, and the low back 
problems he complained of thereafter. However, Quality failed to establish that Mr. Albert 
suffered from preexisting low back problems of the nature and kind he sustained on June 18, 
1990. Therefore, Mr. Albert had no need to jump the higher legal causation hurdle enunciated by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d at 24-25. 
c. Temporary Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a 
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident. 
Mr. Albert remained off work from Quality six days from June 19, 1990, to June 25,1990, when 
Dr. Conger released him back to work. Consequently, Qaulity and/or WCF owed Mr. Albert 
$65.36 in temporary total disability compensation for the six days, minus three, he missed work 
due to the June 18,1990 industrial accident at Quality. [$152.00/week x $.43 weeks (three days) 
= $65.36]. 
d. Permanent Partial Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a 
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident. 
The June 18, 1990 industrial accident at Quality caused half of Mr. Albert's 5% whole person 
impairment due to chronic low back pain. Therefore, Quality and/or WCF owed Mr. Albert 
$1,185.60 in permanent partial disability compensation consequent to the June 18, 1990 
industrial accident. [$152.00/week x 312 weeks x 0.025 = $1,185.60]. 
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e. Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a 
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident. 
The injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the June 18, 1990 did not constitute the direct cause of 
his permanent total disability. Therefore, Quality and WCF did not owe Mr. Albert permanent 
total disability compensation. 
3. The January 21,1991 Industrial Accident with Barnard & Burk 
Group, Inc. Case No. 20011071. 
a. Injuries Caused by the January 21,1991 Industrial Accident at 
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. 
On January 21, 1991 Mr. Albert worked for Barnard & Burk removing asbestos at the Chevron 
Refinery. Mr. Albert slipped, fell, and landed on a pipe with his low back. 
b. Temporary Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins. 
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial 
Accident. 
Mr. Albert did not identify any periods of time he missed work due to the January 21, 2001 
industrial accident at Barnard & Burk. Accordingly, Barnard & Burk owed Mr. Albert no 
temporary total disability as a result of the January 21, 1991 industrial accident. 
c. Permanent Partial Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins. 
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial 
Accident. 
The January 21, 1991 industrial accident at Barnard & Burk caused half of Mr. Albert's 5% 
whole person impairment due to chronic low back pain. Therefore, Barnard & Burk and 
National Union owed Mr. Albert $1,895.40 in permanent partial disability compensation 
consequent to the January 21, 2001 industrial accident. [$243.00/weekx 312 weeks x 0.025 = 
$1,895.40]. 
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d. Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins. 
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial 
Accident 
The injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the January 21, 2001 industrial accident did not 
constitute the direct cause of his permanent total disability. Therefore, Barnard & Burk and 
National Union did not owe Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation. 
4. The July 28,1991 Industrial Accident with American Asbestos 
Abatement Case Nos. 97576, 991214, and 20011072. 
On July 28,1991 Mr. Albert worked for American Asbestos at Hill Air Force Base. Mr. Albert 
fell more than twenty feet from a scaffold and landed primarily on his right foot. Mr. Albert 
suffered a: "right comminuted calcaneus fracture." Mr. Albert underwent three surgeries on his 
right foot consequent to his July 28,1991 industrial accident. Mr. Albert's right foot injury 
caused by his industrial accident of July 28, 1991 resulted in a 9% whole person impairment. 
b. Temporary Total and Permanent Partial Disability 
Compensation Benefits Owed by American Asbestos 
Abatement and/or Workers Compensation Fund as a Result of 
Johnny Albert's July 28,1991 Industrial Accident. 
The 1994 Order resolved the issues concerning temporary total and permanent partial disability 
compensation owed by American Asbestos and WCF to Mr. Albert as a result of the July 28, 
1991 industrial accident. Mr. Albert did not identify any additional periods of temporary total 
disability, nor any additional permanent partial impairment, resultant from the July 28,1991 
industrial accident. Accordingly, American Asbestos and WCF owed Mr. Albert no additional 
temporary total, nor permanent partial, disability compensation for the July 21,1991 industrial 
accident beyond that set forth in the 1994 Order. 
c. Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
American Asbestos Abatement and/or Workers Compensation 
Fund as a Result of Johnny Albert's July 28,1991 Industrial 
Accident. 
The injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the July 28,2001 industrial accident did not constitute 
the direct cause of his permanent total disability. Therefore, American Asbestos and WCF did 
not owe Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation. 
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5. The June 16,1997 Industrial Accident with Ameritemps, Inc. Case 
Nos. 991213 and 20011073. 
a. Injuries Caused by the June 16,1997 Industrial Accident at 
Ameritemps, Inc. 
On June 16, 1997 Mr. Albert worked for Ameritemps at Cisco Foods driving a self-propelled 
pallet jack. Mr. Albert crushed his left great toe between the pallet jack and a steel "I" beam. 
Mr. Albert suffered an angulated fracture of the first proximal phalanx as a result of the June 16, 
1997 industrial accident. Mr. Albert underwent four surgeries with respect to the left great toe 
fracture sustained in June 16,1997 industrial accident. Mr. Albert's industrial accident with 
Ameritemps on June 16,1997 caused him a 4% whole person impairment due to his left foot 
injury. 
b. Temporary Total and Permanent Partial Disability 
Compensation Benefits Owed by Ameritemps, Inc. and/or 
Hartford Ins. as a Result of Johnny Albert's June 16,1997 
Industrial Accident. 
Because of the resolution of the permanent total disability claim herein, I deferred further 
consideration of the issues concerning temporary total disability compensation and permanent 
partial disability compensation. 
C. Permanent Total Disability Compensation. 
1. Permanent Total Disability. 
Mr. Albert is permanently and totally disabled. 
2. The Cause of Johnny Albert's Permanent Total Disability. 
Mr. Albert sustained a 2lA % whole person impairment as a result of a low back injury he 
sustained on June 18, 1990 while employed for Quality Plating. Mr. Albert remained off work 
only one week following his June 18, 1990 industrial injury then returned to regular employment 
with Quality Plating. 
Mr. Albert also sustained a 2lA % whole person impairment as a result of a low back injury he 
sustained on January 21,1991 while employed for Barnard & Burk. Mr. Albert did not identify 
any lost time at work as a result of his January 21,1991 industrial accident. 
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Mr. Albert's industrial accident with American Asbestos on July 28, 1991 resulted in a 9% whole 
person impairment as a result of injuries to his right foot caused by the accident. Mr. Albert also 
suffered from serious psychological problems that caused him considerable difficulty in learning 
new tasks or performing jobs that required any mental acuity. Mr. Albert's psychological 
problems left him with 30% whole person impairment. Of Mr. Albert's psychological 
impairment, 20% preexisted his industrial accidents, and 10% derived undifferentiated from his 
industrial injuries. Mr. Albert's collective physical and psychological problems left him 48% 
impaired as to the whole person. 
Mr. Albert with all of his physical and psychological problems did in fact return to work with 
Ameritemps until his final industrial accident on June 16,1997. However, after Mr. Albert 
fractured his left great toe on June 16, 1997 followed by four consequent surgeries, Mr. Albert 
did not return to work. Mr. Albert's industrial accident with Ameritemps on June 16,1997 
resulted in a 4% whole person impairment as a result of injuries to his left foot caused by the 
accident. 
The Utah Supreme Court specifically held that in permanent total disability cases it is the duty of 
the Labor Commission to determine the ultimate issue of disability. Hardman v. Salt Lake City 
Fleet Management, 725 P. 2d 1323,1326 (Utah 1986). Professor Larson stated that: 
Apart from apportionment statutes, the employer is generally held liable for the 
entire disability resulting from a combination of the prior disability and the 
present injury. ARTHUR LARSON and LEX LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS* COMPENSATION 
LAW § 90.01 (2002). 
Neither applicable Utah Code Amend § 35-1-67 (1995), nor its successors, nor its predecessors 
that deal with permanent total disability, contain any provisions for apportionment of liability. 
Utah Code Amend § 35-l-67(l)(b) (1995) provides in relevant part that: 
To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee 
has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence that: 
(ii) the industrial accident... was the direct cause of the employee's 
permanent total disability. 
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The Utah Court of Appeals held that: 
Under the codd lot' doctrine, the Commission may find permanent total disability 
when a relatively small percentage of impairment caused by an industrial accident 
is combined with other factors to render the claimant unable to obtain suitable 
employment. Hoskins v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 918 P. 2d 150, 154 (Utah 
App. 1996) (citing: Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Management, 725 P. 2d 
1323,1326 (Utah 1986). 
The case of Smith v. Mity Lite presented facts similar to the present case. Smith v. Mity Lite, 939 
P. 2d 684 (Utah App. 1997). In Smith the claimant suffered from nonindustrial depression, 
somatoform pain disorder, opiate dependency, personality disorder and depression, id. at 689. 
The Utah Court of Appeals held that the Labor Commission ought to have found permanent total 
disability where the claimant proved by a preponderance of the evidence the: "[industrial 
accident caused a portion of Smith's physical impairment; that he cannot perform his former job; 
that he is currently disabled." id. at 690. 
In the present case, despite the legion of medical and psychological impairments accumulated by 
Mr. Albert during the course of his life, he remained able to work until the injury he sustained on 
June 16,1997 with Ameritemps. The fractured great toe on June 16,1997, with the subsequent 
four surgeries and 4% whole person permanent impairment, proved to be the proverbial straw 
that broke the camel's back. Mr. Albert never returned to work after the June 16,1997 industrial 
accident, and thereafter remained permanently and totally disabled. Hence, Mr. Albert's 
industrial accident of June 16,1997directly caused his permanent total disability.13 
3. Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Ameritemps, Inc. and Hartford Ins. as a Result of Johnny Albert's 
June 16,1997 Industrial Accident. 
13
 Some of the respondents argued that Social Security Administration's determination of 
Mr. Albert's permanent total disability based on his psychological impairments should be 
determinative concerning the cause of his permanent total disability for workers' compensation 
benefits. Of course Social Security's determinations are not binding on the Labor Commission. 
Otherwise, the Labor Commission in every like case would simply await and adopt the decision 
of the Social Security Administration as to permanent total disability and the cause thereof. 
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Mr. Albert's industrial accident of June 16, 1997 directly caused his permanent total disability. 
Mr. Albert never worked again after his industrial accident on June 16, 1997. Mr. Albert became 
permanently and totally disabled on June 16,1997. Therefore, Ameritemps and Hartford owed 
Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation at the rate of $240.00 per week from June 16, 
1997, to June 17, 2003. After June 17, 2003 Ameritemps and Hartford owed Mr. Albert 
permanent total disability compensation at the rate of $240.00 less 50% of any Social Security 
retirement benefits received by Mr. Albert during the same period. Ameritemps and Hartford are 
entitled to an offset for any amounts of temporary total, or permanent partial, disability 
compensation paid to Mr. Albert for any time period that they also owed Mr. Albert permanent 
total disability compensation. 
V. ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that all of Johnny Albert's claims against the respondent, 
Transwest Construction, in Claim No. 2002595 are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all of Johnny Albert's claims against the respondents 
Uninsured Employer's Fund and Employers' Reinsurance Fund in Case Nos. 97576, 
991213,991214, 20011070,20011071,20011072,20011073, and 2002595 are hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in Case No. 20011070, Quality Plating and/or Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah shall pay Johnny Albert temporary total disability 
compensation from June 18,1990, to June 25,1990, at the rate of $152.00 per week for 0.43 
weeks, for a total of $65.36. That amount is accrued, due and payable in a lump sum, plus 
interest at eight percent (8%) per annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in Case No. 20011070, Quality Plating and/or Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah shall pay Johnny Albert permanent partial disability 
compensation for a two and one half percent (2lA %) impairment rating at the rate of $152.00 
per week for a total of $1,185.60. That amount is accrued, due and payable in a lump sum, plus 
interest at eight percent (8%) per annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Johnny Albert's claims for permanent total disability 
compensation against Quality Plating and Workers' Compensation Fund in Case No. 
20011070 are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Quality Plating and/or Workers Compensation Fund 
shall with respect to Case No. 20011070 pay all medical expenses reasonably related to Johnny 
Albert's industrial accident of June 18, 1990, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Johnny Albert's claim against Barnard & Burk and/or 
National Union Fire Ins. for temporary total disability compensation in Case No. 20011071 
is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in Case No. 20011071 respondents, Barnard & Burk 
and/or National Union Fire Ins., shall pay Johnny Albert permanent partial disability 
compensation for a two and one half percent (2/4 %) impairment rating at the rate of $243.00 
per week for a total of $1,895.40. That amount is accrued, due and payable in a lump sum, plus 
interest at eight percent (8%) per annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Johnny Albert's claims against Barnard & Burk and 
National Union Fire Ins. in Case No. 20011071 for permanent total disability compensation 
are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents, Barnard & Burk and/or National Union 
Fire Ins., shall with respect to Case No. 20011071 pay all medical expenses reasonably related 
to Johnny Albert's industrial accident of January 21,1991, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per 
annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Johnny Albert's claims against American Asbestos 
Abatement and/or Workers Compensation Fund in Case Nos. 97576, 991214, and 20011072 
for additional temporary total disability compensation, permanent partial disability 
compensation, and permanent total disability compensation are hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents, American Asbestos Abatement and/or 
Workers Compensation Fund shall with respect to Case Nos. 97576, 991214, and 20011072 
pay all medical expenses reasonably related to Johnny Albert's industrial accident of July 28, 
1991, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Ins. in Case Nos. 
991213 and 20011073 shall pay Johnny Albert permanent total disability compensation at the 
rate of $240.00 per week from the date of permanent total disability on June 16,1997, until June 
16, 2003 in the total amount of $74,880.00, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum for 
each payment as it came due, less any compensation already paid by respondents Ameritemps, 
Inc. or Hartford Ins. After June 16, 2003, respondents, Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Ins., 
shall continue to pay Johnny Albert permanent total disability compensation at the rate of 
$240.00 per week less fifty percent (50%) of any Social Security retirement benefits received by 
Johnny Albert for the same period. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents, Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Ins., shall 
with respect to Case Nos. 991213 and 20011073 pay all medical expenses reasonably related to 
Johnny Albert's industrial accident of June 16, 1997, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per 
annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents, Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Ins., shall 
pay statutory attorneys9 fees of $10,352.00 directly to Richard Burke. That amount shall be 
deducted from Johnny Albert's award and sent directly to Richard Burke's office. 
Dated this 22nd day of July 2003, 
j Ribhard M. La Jeunesse 
^^^x^dnftnistrative Law Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion For Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific 
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their Responses to the Motion for Review 
within 20 days of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct 
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
Response. If none of the parties specifically requests review by the Appeals Board, the review 
will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner. 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
JOHNNY ALBERT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT 
and WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND; 
QUALITY PLATTING CO and 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND; 
BARNARD & BURK GROUP, INC. and 
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS.; 
AMERITEMPS, INC. and HARTFORD 
INS.; TRANSWEST CONSTRUCTION; 
UNINSURANCED EMPLOYERS' FUND 
and EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND, 
Respondents. 
ORDER DENYING REQUEST 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Case Nos. 97-0576,99-1213, 
99-1214,01-1070,01-1071, 
01-1072,01-1073, & 02-0595 
Barnard & Burk and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, National Union Fire 
Insurance (referred to jointly as "Barnard" hereafter), ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor 
Commission to reconsider its prior determination awarding benefits to Johnny Albert under the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-
46b-13. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
Judge La Jeunesse ordered Barnard to pay permanent partial disability compensation and 
medical expenses arising from a back injury Mr. Albert suffered at Barnard on January 21, 1991. 
Barnard then sought Appeals Board review of Judge La Jeunesse's decision on the grounds that Mr. 
Albert's claim for medical expenses is barred by §417(1) of the Act and his claim for permanent 
partial disability compensation is barred by § 417(2) of the Act. In response, Mr. Albert argued that, 
because Barnard failed to raise its §417 defenses in its answer to Mr. Albert's claim, Barnard waived 
those defenses. 
In its decision issued May 3,2004, the Appeals Board concluded that Barnard had waived its 
§417 defenses. The Appeals Board therefore affirmed Judge La Jeunesse's award of benefits to Mr. 
Albert. Barnard now asks the Appeals Board to reconsider its decision. Barnard argues that it: 1) 
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was under no obligation to raise its §417(1) defense in its answer to Mr. Albert's claim; and 2) did, 
in fact, adequately raise its §417 defenses. 
DISCUSSION 
Barnard's obligation to raise its §417(1) defense. Section § 417(1) of the Act contains the 
following restriction to an injured worker's right to receive medical treatment for work-related 
injuries (emphasis added): 
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in nonpermanent total disability 
cases an employee's medical benefit entitlement ceases if for a period of three 
consecutive years the employee does not: 
(a) incur medical expenses reasonably related to the industrial accident; and 
(b) submit the medical expenses incurred to the employee's employer or insurance 
carrier for payment. 
Barnard argues that it was not required to raise the foregoing statute's three year "incur and 
submit" requirement as a defense in its answer to Mr. Albert's claim because the defense only 
applies to "nonpermanent total disability cases," and at the time Barnard filed its answer, Mr. 
Albert's claim was for permanent total disability. 
As a preliminary matter, the Appeals Board notes that Barnard failed to raise this issue in its 
original motion for review. Section 63-46b-12(l)(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
requires a party seeking agency review to "state the grounds for review." This requirement is 
necessary to avoid piecemeal review proceedings. Because Barnard failed to raise this issue as a 
grounds for review in its initial motion for review, the Appeals Board declines to consider the issue 
for the first time as part of this reconsideration proceeding. 
But even if the Appeals Board were to consider the merits of Barnard's new argument, the 
Appeals Board would reject that argument. Mr. Albert's application for hearing made a claim for 
both permanent total disability compensation and medical benefits. The claim for medical benefits 
was not dependent upon the claim for permanent total disability compensation. It was therefore 
Barnard's obligation to raise in its answer all its defenses to the medical claim, including its §417(1) 
defense. 
Sufficiency of Barnard's §417 defenses. Having concluded that Barnard was required to raise 
its §417 defenses in its answer to Mr. Albert's claim, the Appeals Board must consider whether 
Barnard did so. Barnard's answer contained only vague and tentative references to statutes of 
limitation and notice provisions that might be found somewhere in the Workers' Compensation Act 
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or Occupational Disease Act. Barnard's answer did not "state all affirmative defenses with sufficient 
accuracy and detail that an applicant may be fully informed of the nature of the defense asserted," as 
required by the Commission's Rule 602-2-l.D. 
Barnard argues that even if its answer was not sufficient under the Commission's Rule 602-2-
1 .D to preserve its §417 defenses, its answer was sufficient under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and appellate precedent interpreting those rules. However, it is the Commission's rules that govern 
adjudicative process before the Commission. Consequently, the Appeals Board looks to the 
Commission's Rule R602-2-1.D, rather than the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to evaluate the 
sufficiency of Barnard's answer. 
For the reasons already discussed in this decision and in the Appeals Board's previous 
decision, the Appeals Board concludes that Barnard's answer did not raise its §417 defenses and that 
those defenses were, therefore, waived. 
ORDER 
The Commission reaffirms its previous decision and denies Barnard's request for 
reconsideration. It is so ordered. 
Dated this ^ f ^ d a y of October, 2004. 
yJ^A<M^S>J jQt£WK~ 
Patricia S. Drawe 
^ i4c 
Josefch E. Hatch 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition For Review 
with that Court within 30 days of the date of this Order. 
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Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Insurance, Petitioners, v. Labor Commission, 
Workers' Compensation Fund, American Asbestos Abatement, and Johnny Albert, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 20040953-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
2005 UTApp 491; 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 469 
November 10, 2005, Filed 
NOTICE: [**1] THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO 
REVISION BEFORE PUBLICATION IN THE 
OFFICIAL REPORTER. 
DISPOSITION: Affirmed. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellants, an employer 
and its insurer, sought judicial review of the Utah Labor 
Commission Appeals Board's denial of their motion for 
review of a decision of a Commission Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) awarding appellee employee perma-
nent total disability compensation benefits under Utah 
Code 4//// $ 34A-2-413 (Supp. 2005) 
OVERVIEW: After severely injuring one foot while on 
the job, the employee never returned to work. The ALJ 
determined that the employee was permanently and to-
tally disabled and that the foot injury directly caused his 
disability. The Board's decision was issued after the ini-
tial determination of total permanent disability, but be-
fore any opportunity for appellants to submit a reem-
ployment plan. The court held that the order was a final 
agency action. In the Board's order denying the request 
for reconsideration, the "Notice of Appeal Rights" sec-
tion identified an appeal to the court as the only review 
available. When the Board denied the request for recon-
sideration, that marked the end of its decision making 
process concerning the issue of permanent total disabil-
ity. Although the order left unresolved the issue of reem-
ployment, it decided permanent total disability with fi-
nality. Therefore, the court had subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the action. The court also held that given that 
the Board made the appropriate findings to support its 
conclusion under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(I)(h)(i)-
(lii). its conclusion did not exceed the bounds of reason-
ableness and rationality. 
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the order of the Board. 
COUNSEL: Theodore E. Kanell and Joseph C. 
Alamilla, Salt Lake City, for Petitioners. 
Richard R. Burke, James R. Black, Alan L. Hemiebold, 
and Floyd W. Holm, Salt Lake City, for Respondents. 
JUDGES: Before Judges McHugh, Orme, and Thome. 
OPINIONBY: Carolyn B. McHugh 
OPINION: Original Proceeding m this Court 
McHUGH, Judge: 
|*P1] Ameritemps, Inc. (Ameritemps) and Hart-
ford Insurance (collectively, Petitioners) seek judicial 
review of the Utah Labor Commission (Commission) 
Appeals Board's (Board) denial of their motion for re-
view of a decision of a Commission Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) awarding Johnny Albert permanent total 
disability compensation benefits. See Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-413 (Supp. 2005). nl We affirm. 
nl We recognize that "in workers' compensa-
tion claims, the law existing at the time of the in-
jury applies in relation to that injury." Brown & 
Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comni'n, 947 P.2d 
671. 675 (Utah 1997). Because the relevant por-
tions of the current version of this statute, see 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 (Supp. 2005), are 
substantively identical to the relevant portions of 
the version in effect at the time of Albert's in-
jury, see Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (Supp. 
1995), we cite to the most current version 
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reader. 
BACKGROUND 
|*P2] Over the span of approximately seven years, 
Albert was injured in a number of industrial accidents 
thai occurred while he was working for various employ-
ers. With the exception of his final accident, Albert re-
turned to work after each incident, despite having suf-
fered some level of whole person impairment. In his final 
industrial accident, which occurred on June 16, 1997, 
while he was working for Ameritemps, Albert severely 
injured his left foot. Although he had four separate sur-
geries to correct the problems that resulted from this in-
jury, Albert never returned to work. 
[*P3] Thereafter, Albert filed a claim with the 
Commission against Ameritemps for, among other 
things, permanent total disability compensation benefits. 
On December 17. 2002, a hearing was held before the 
ALJ, which addressed numerous claims Albert had filed 
with the Commission, including his claims against 
Ameritemps. Albert 's other claims were for disability 
benefits arising out of industrial accidents that occurred 
while he was working for employers other than Amer-
itemps. On July 22, 2003, the ALJ issued a decision re-
garding Albert's claims. 
; i 4] As an initial matter, the ALJ [**3] noted in 
the decision that all of the parties opposing Albert's 
claims, including Ameritemps, had "conceded that [he] 
was permanently and totally disabled," but that each 
party "alleged that an injury other than the one respec-
tively defended by [each party] directly caused [Albert 's 
permanent and total disability." The ALJ found, based 
upon a medical evaluation contained in the record, that 
the left foot injury Albert had suffered while working for 
Ameritemps "caused him a 4% whole person impair-
ment." The ALJ also found that 
the preponderance of the evidence in this 
case revealed that despite the legion of 
medical and psychological impairments 
accumulated by [Albert] during the 
course of his life, he remained able to 
work until the injury he sustained on June 
16, 1997[,] with Ameritemps. [His left 
foot injury] on June 16, 1997, with the 
subsequent four surgeries and 4% whole 
person permanent impairment, proved to 
be the proverbial straw that broke the 
camel's back. [Albert] never returned to 
work after the June 16. 1997 industrial 
accident, and thereafter by consensus re-
mained permanently and totally disabled. 
I T5] Based upon these findings, the [**4] appli-
cable statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-4J3 (Supp. 
2005), and the odd-lot doctrine, see, e.g., Peck v. Eimco 
Process Equip. Co., 748 P.2d 572, 574-75 (Utah J987); 
Zupon v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d 960, 963-64 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993), the ALJ concluded that Albert 
was permanently totally disabled and that the June 16, 
1997 industrial accident, which occurred while Albert 
was employed by Ameri temps, "directly caused his 
permanent total disability." Accordingly, the ALJ entered 
an award of permanent total disability compensation 
benefits in favor of Albert and against Petitioners. 
|*P6] On August 21, 2003, Petitioners filed a mo-
tion for review with the Board. On May 2, 2004, the 
Board issued an order denying Petitioners' motion, af-
firming and adopting the ALJ's factual findings, and af-
firming the ALJ's decision as it applied to Petitioners. 
Petitioners now seek judicial review of that order. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[*I' /"] Petitioners argue that this court does not 
have subject matter jurisdiction to review the Board's 
order. A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction presents 
a question [**5] of law, which we review for correct-
ness. See Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT81, P8, 
3! P. 3d 1147. 
[*P8] Petitioners also argue that there is evidence 
in the record that precludes an award of permanent total 
disability compensation benefits to Albert and, as such, 
the Board incorrectly applied the law to the facts in this 
case. When reviewing the Board's decision, we will dis-
turb its factual findings only if they are "not supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
16(4)(gj (2004). Further, "when an agency has discretion 
to apply its factual findings to the law, we will not dis-
turb the agency's application unless its determination 
exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." 
Smith v. Mity Lite, 939 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) (quotations and citation omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
[*P9] Before arguing their challenge to the Board's 
substantive decision, Petitioners argue that there has 
been no final agency action creating subject matter juris-
diction in this court because the ALJ and the Board did 
not complete the two-step [**6] process set forth under 
the Workers' Compensation Act for establishing perma-
nent total disability. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 
(Supp. 2005). In response, the Commission, Albert, 
American Asbestos Abatement, and Workers' Compen-
sation Fund (collectively, Respondents) assert that Peti-
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tioneis tailed to preserve this issue for appeal and waived 
an> aigument that Albert is not permanently totally dis-
abled. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 
I. Preservation and Waiver 
[*P10| Petitioners concede that they did not raise 
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction prior to their brief 
with this court. Notwithstanding that admission, we may 
consider it: "Questions regarding subject matter jurisdic-
tion may be raised at any time because such issues de-
termine whether a court has authority to address the mer-
its of a particular case." Housing Auth. v. Snyder, 2002 
UT 28. PI I, 44 P.3d 724. In addition, because subject 
matter jurisdiction is a prerequisite to this court's power 
to consider the substantive issues, the requirement that 
the court have proper jurisdiction over the subject of the 
dispute cannot be waived. See, e.g., [**7] Chen v. Stew-
art, 2004 UT 82, P34, 100 P. 3d ^1177; Barnard v. Was-
sermann, 855 P.2d 243, 248 (Utah 1993). Issues relating 
to subject matter jurisdiction are threshold questions that 
should be addressed before resolving other claims. See 
Snvder, 2002 UT 28 at PI I. Because we conclude that 
Petitioners' challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is 
properly before us. we consider it before addressing their 
challenge to the Board's substantive decision. 
II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
[*P11] The Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
grants jurisdiction to the appellate courts over "final 
agency actions." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-I4(l), (3)(a) 
(2004). Thus, the first issue for consideration is whether 
the Board's decision finding Albert permanently totally 
disabled is a "final agency action," id., over which this 
court can exercise subject matter jurisdiction. To answer 
that question, we must examine the specific statutory 
provisions involved. 
[*P12] The procedure for establishing permanent 
total disability is set forth in the Workers' Compensation 
Act. See id. § 34A-2-413. Under that statutory [**8] 
scheme, the injured employee must first meet his or her 
burden of establishing permanent total disability and 
causation by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. $ 
34A-2-4I3(i)(b). The Commission must then consider 
the evidence to determine whether the employee is per-
manently totally disabled and unable to perform reasona-
bly available work. See id. £ 34A-2-413(1 )(c). Before 
disability benefits can be awarded, however, the Com-
mission must follow a two-step process outlined in sec-
tion 34A-2-413. See id. £ 34A-2-413(6). The Utah Su-
preme Court explained the procedure for awarding such 
benefits in Thomas v Color Country Management, 2004 
UT12, 84 P. 3d 120 L stating: 
Section 34A-2-413(6) outlines the process 
an administrative law judge must follow 
when determining whether an injured em-
ployee is entitled to permanent total dis-
ability compensation. This section re-
quires that a finding be issued in two 
parts—an initial finding and a final find-
ing. The initial finding of permanent total 
disability triggers a review period in 
which the employer or its insurance car-
rier may submit a reemployment plan. 
Ann.] S 34A-2-[See Utah Code 
4l3(6)(a)(ii) [**9] , (d). This subsection 
specifically states that the initial "finding 
by the Commission of permanent total 
disability is not final, unless otherwise 
agreed to by the parties, until" the em-
ployer has the opportunity to submit a re-
employment plan, the administrative law 
judge reviews this reemployment plan and 
the reemployment activities undertaken 
pursuant to statute, and the administrative 
law judge holds a hearing. Id. § 34A-2-
413(6)(a). The intent of the reemployment 
plan is to determine whether the injured 
employee can be rehabilitated in order to 
reenter the workforce, and a final finding 
of permanent total disability is held in re-
serve until the possibilities of reemploy-
ment are either exhausted or abandoned. 
Only after all of these requirements have 
been met does the finding of permanent 
total disability become final. 
Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at P2L The Board's decision in this 
case was issued after the initial determination of total 
permanent disability, but before any opportunity for Peti-
tioners to submit a reemployment plan. Thus, by the ex-
press terms of the Workers' Compensation Act, the "find-
ing by the [Board] of permanent total disability is not 
[**10] final, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, 
until" after the employer is given an opportunity to sub-
mit a reemployment plan. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
413(6)(a). 
[*P13] Respondents argue that the parties agreed 
that the initial determination of the Board was final as a 
result of a colloquy between the ALJ and counsel for 
Ameritemps. When the ALJ asked whether Amer-
itemps was challenging that Albert was permanently 
totally disabled, counsel for Ameritemps responded: "I 
don't have any proof to the contrary. I'm not here to sub-
mit proof on that issue." We agree with the ALJ's deter-
mination that Ameritemps conceded that Albert was 
permanently totally disabled for purposes of the initial 
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finding of disability and causation. There is nothing in 
the discussion between the ALJ and counsel for Amer-
itemps, however, that supports a finding that Amer-
itemps intended to waive its right to submit a reemploy-
ment plan if the industrial accident that occurred while 
Albert was employed by A men temps was found to be 
the direct cause of Albert's permanent total disability. 
Thus, if this court has subject matter jurisdiction, it must 
be based on a conclusion that the [**11] initial determi-
nation of permanent total disability is a final agency ac-
tion.. 
[*P14| From a cursory reading of the Workers' 
Compensation Act's pronouncement that the initial de-
termination is not final, it might appear that this court 
need inquire no further to conclude that the Board's order 
at issue is not a "final agency action," id. ^ 63-46b-
14(1), (3)(a), and that this court is without subject matter 
jurisdiction. The analysis of the Utah Supreme Court in 
Thomas, however, requires that we consider both 
whether the initial determination by the Board is a "final 
order" of that agency, and separately, whether it is a "fi-
nal agency action." See 2004 UT 12 at PI4. Although the 
terms are similar, they are different in their effect on this 
court's jurisdiction. 
[*P15] In Thomas, the Utah Supreme Court con-
sidered whether an initial determination of permanent 
total disability under section 34A-2-4I3 was a '"final 
order'" of the Commission for which an abstract of 
judgment could be issued allowing the employee to en-
force the temporary disability award in district court. Id. 
at PI 1. After reviewing the language of section 34A-2-
413, the Thomas |**12] court concluded that "because 
initial findings are not final orders, subsistence payment 
orders predicated upon initial findings are also not final 
orders." Id. at P25. In the absence of a final order from 
the Commission, no abstract was available. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-212(l)(a) (2001) ("An abstract of 
any final order providing an award may be filed . . . in 
the office of the clerk of the district court of any county 
in the state."). 
|*P16| In reaching its conclusion, the Thomas 
court distinguished between a "'final order'" of an agency 
that could support an abstract of judgment and a "'final 
agency action"' that can confer subject matter jurisdiction 
on the appellate courts. Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at PI4. 
Although the Utah Administrative Proce-
dures Act grants jurisdiction to the appel-
late courts over "final agency actions." it 
"does not specifically define" this term. 
Barker v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 970 
P.2d 702, 705 (Utah 1998). Since this act 
does not provide a definition, we devel-
oped the Union Pacific test to determine 
when administrative orders constitute "fi-
nal agency actions" (**13) in order to 
invoke appellate jurisdiction. [See Union 
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
2000 UT 40, PI6, 999 P.2d 17]. Unlike 
the term "final agency action," the term 
"final order" is defined in the Workers' 
Compensation Act. Because this act 
clearly defines "final order," we need not 
turn to Union Pacific for guidance on 
what constitutes a "final order" for which 
bstract may issue. Thus, what consti-
I a final order for purposes of appel-
late review is different than what consti-
tutes a final order for purposes of the is-
siian.ce of an abstract of an administrative 
award. 
Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at PI4. The Thomas court then 
determined that an initial finding of permanent total dis-
ability was not a "final order" as defined by the Workers' 
Compensation Act. See id. at P25. But, the Thomas court 
did not consider whether an initial decision of the Com-
mission finding permanent total disability is a "final 
agency action" that can confer subject matter jurisdiction 
on an appellate court for puiposes of judicial review. It 
merely indicated that the analysis of that question should 
be performed using the test announced [**14] in Union 
Pacific. See Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at PI5. 
[*P17] The recent per curiam decision from a di-
vided panel of this court in Target Trucking v. Labor 
Commission, 2005 UT App 70, 108 P. 3d 128 (mem.) (per 
curiam), may have confused these two concepts. In Tar-
get Trucking, we dismissed an appeal of a preliminary 
determination of permanent total disability for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, relying on the statutory lan-
guage. See id. at P6\ see also Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
413(6)(a) ("A finding by the Commission of permanent 
total disability is not final, unless otherwise agreed to by 
the parties . . . ."). In doing so, this court made no dis-
tinction between a "final order" and a "final agency ac-
tion," and did not apply the Union Pacific three-part test 
to determine whether we should exercise appellate juris-
diction. See Union Pac, 2000 UT 40 at PI6. In consider-
ing the issue now before this court, we apply that test to 
answer the initial question concerning this court's subject 
matter jurisdiction. "Although the Union Pacific test does 
not apply to determining what constitutes [**15] a 'final 
order' for which an abstract may issue under the Work-
ers' Compensation Act, Union Pacific continues to be the 
standard by which 'final administrative action' will be 
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judged for the purpose of judicial review." Thomas, 2004 
'uf 12 at PI5. 
|"PI8) In Union Pacific, the Utah Supreme Court 
adopted the following three-part test to determine 
whether an agency action is final: 
(1) Has administrative decision making 
reached a stage where judicial review will 
not disrupt the orderly process of adjudi-
cation?; 
(2) Have rights or obligations been deter-
mined or will legal consequences flow 
from the agency action?; and 
(3) Is the agency action, in whole or in 
part, not preliminary, preparatory, proce-
dural, or intermediate with regard to sub-
sequent agency action? 
Union Pac, 2000 UT 40 at PJ6. Agency actions that 
meet the foregoing test are appealable from the date of 
the order's issuance. See id. 
|*P19| Examining the Board's order under the 
three-part test set forth in Union Pacific, we conclude 
that the order is a final agency action. 
A. Orderly Process of Adjudication 
|*P20] This matter comes [**16] to this court after 
the Board's denial of Petitioners' motion for review of the 
ALJ's decision. "By denying reconsideration of its earlier 
findings and conclusions, the [Board] reached the end of 
its decision making process" on the issue of permanent 
total disability. Id. at PI9. The Board's order denying 
Petitioners' motion for review includes a "Notice of Ap-
peal Rights" section, which provides that a party may 
either (1) within twenty days of the date of the order, 
request that the Board reconsider the order, or (2) within 
thirty days of the date of the order, petition this court for 
judicial review of the order. A request for reconsidera-
tion was filed by a party that was involved in the pro-
ceedings before the Commission, but is not a party to this 
appeal. In the Board's order denying that request for re-
consideration, the "Notice of Appeal Rights" section 
identified an appeal to this court as the only review 
available. n2 When the Board denied the request for re-
consideration, that marked the end of its decision making 
process concerning the issue of permanent total disabil-
ity. 
Because of the nature of agency proceed-
ings, final actions often take place seria-
tim, disposing [**17] completely of dis-
crete issues in one order while leaving 
other issues for later orders. Such orders 
will be final as to any issue fully decided 
by that order and appealable any time 
from the date of that order to the last day 
to appeal the last final agency action in 
the case. 
Barker v. Utah Pub. Sen'. Comm'n, 970 P.2d 702, 706 
(Utah 1998). Although issues remained unresolved con-
cerning the possibility of reemployment, the question of 
whether Albert was permanently totally disabled was 
disposed of completely by the Board. Thus, "judicial 
review would not . . . interfere^ with the [BoardJ's pro-
ceedings, since the [Board] had already refused to recon-
sider its prior order[]." Union Pac, 2000 UT 40 at PI9. 
n2 The Utah Supreme Court has indicated 
that "although omission of this language is not 
dispositive for our purposes on the question of 
whether an agency order is final, it certainly sig-
nals . . . that the [agency] believes it is." Union 
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2000 
UT40, P19 n.6, 999 P.2d 17. 
[**18] 
B. Rights or Obligations Determined 
[*P21] In the decision from which Petitioners ap-
peal, the Board determined that Albert is permanently 
totally disabled and also awarded permanent total dis-
ability compensation payments to Albert to start imme-
diately. Consequently, the second part of the Union Pa-
cific test is met. See Barker, 970 P.2d at 706 (determin-
ing that agency action was final where "the language of 
the order makes clear that the [agency] determined obli-
gations of the parties with which the parties must imme-
diately comply"); see also Union Pac, 2000 UT 40 at 
P20 (concluding that the second prong of the three-part 
test was met where taxpayer's tax obligations were de-
termined). 
C. Preliminary, Preparatory, Procedural, or Interme-
diate 
[*P22] The third step in determining whether 
agency action is final for purposes of appeal is an analy-
sis of whether that action is, "in whole or in part, not 
preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate." 
Union Pac, 2000 UT 40 at PI6. The Utah Supreme 
Court has provided examples of the types of proceedings 
that are not final under this last prong of the Union Pa-
cific [**19| analysis, 
The Utah cases on finality found no final 
order in the following circumstances: (1) 
a remand for further proceedings, Sloan v. 
Board of Review, 781 P. 2d 463, 464 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989): (2) an order con-
verting informal proceedings into formal 
ones, Merit Elec. & Instrumentation v. 
Department of Commerce, 902 P.2d 151, 
153 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); and (3) a denial 
of a motion to dismiss, Barney v. Division 
of Occupational & Professional Licens-
ing, 828 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). These cases do not involve actions 
in the nature of a seriatim final order; they 
all involve preliminary, preparatory, pro-
cedural, or intermediate decisions 
Barker, 970 P Id at 706; s e e als< > ( //•/ '". ) i Pac, 2000 UT 
40 at P2I. 
[*P23] M though the Board's order leaves unre-
solved the issue of reemployment, it decides permanent 
total disability with finality. The order ended the decision 
making process at the agency level on this issue. Thus, 
the initial determination of permanent total disability was 
in the nature of a seriatim final order that was immedi-
ately appealable despite the fact that the [**20] agency 
still was required to conduct the second part of the sec-
tion 34A-2-413 analysis to determine whether Albert can 
be rehabilitated. n3 To the extent our decision in Target 
Trucking v. Labor Commission, 2005 UT App 70, 108 
P.3d 128 (mem.) (per curiam), holds otherwise, we dis-
avow it and instead follow the mandate of the Utah Su-
preme Court in Thomas v. Color Country Management, 
2004 UT 12, 84 P.3d 120L to consider the issues of fi-
nality for purposes of appellate jurisdiction under the 
Union Pacific test, see 2000 UT40 at PI6. 
n3 This second step can be avoided \f the 
parties agree that the finding of permanent total 
disability is final, see Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
4I3(6)(a), or if the ALJ is provided with notice 
thai the employer or us insurance carrier will not 
submit a reemployment •~1-" ^'^ •"! v' ? ' ' ' 7-
4l3(6)(a)(ii)(B). 
|*P24| This conclusion that the initial determina-
tion of permanent total disability |**21| is not a final 
order of the agency, but is a final agency action, also 
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reconciles the statutory language with the applicable 
regulations. Section 34A-2-413(6)(a) expressly states that 
the initial determination is not final and, based on that 
language, the Utah Supreme Court held in Thomas that 
the initial determination is not a "final order" of the 
agency. See 2004 UT 12 at P25. In contrast, the Com-
mission's regulations state that "[a] preliminary determi-
nation of permanent total disability by the Labor Com-
missioner or [the] Board is a final agency action for pur-
poses of appellate judicial review." Utah Admin. Code 
R612-l-10(C)(l)(c). 
[*P25] Because the concepts of "final order" and 
"final agency action" are defined differently, the statute 
and the regulation can be reconciled. n4 An initial de-
termination of permanent total disability is not a final 
order of the agency and, therefore, an abstract of judg-
ment cannot be issued to enforce a permanent total dis-
ability compensation award based on that preliminary 
finding. See Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at P25. In contrast, the 
preliminary determination of permanent total disability 
does conclude the [**22] agency decision making on the 
initial question of whether Albert is permanently totally 
disabled. Thus, it is a seriatim final agency action, and 
this court does have subject matter jurisdiction to review 
it. 
n4 In 7drget Trucking v. Labor Commission, 
2005 UT App 70, P6, 108 P.3d 128 (mem.) (per 
curiam), this court concluded, without applying 
the Union Pacific test for finality, that the admin-
istrative rule was in conflict with the express 
statutory provisions. Because we hold that a pre-
liminary determination of permanent total disabil-
ity is a final agency action, but not a final order 
" agency, we now harmonize the rule and the 
III. Substantive Review of Board's Order 
[*P26] Having concluded that we have subject 
matter jurisdiction to review the Board's order, we now 
turn to Petitioners' substantive challenge to that order. 
Petitioners argue that there is evidence in the record that 
precludes an award of permanent total disability com-
pensation benefits to Albert and, [**23] therefore, the 
Board incorrectly applied the law to the facts in this case. 
We disagree. 
[*P27| To advance their argument that there is evi-
dence in the record that precludes an award of permanent 
total disability compensation benefits, Petitioners selec-
tively recite the portions of the record evidence that sup-
port their position. Based on that selective recitation of 
the facts presented to the agency, Petitioners assert that 
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the Board should have reached a different conclusion. 
This argument amounts to an indirect challenge to the 
Board's factual findings concerning the June 16, 1997 
industrial accident, and is an attempt by Petitioners to 
reargue the weight of the evidence in favor of their posi-
tion, which is a futile tactic on appeal. See Questar Pipe-
line Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1175, 1178 
(Utah J993) ("When reviewing an agency's decision, [we 
do] not . . . reweigh the evidence."). Further, we will not 
disturb the Board's findings simply because another con-
clusion can be drawn from the evidence in the record. 
See Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998) (stating that "findings will 'not be over-
turned (**24] if based on substantial evidence, even if 
another conclusion from the evidence is permissible"" 
(citation omitted)). Because Petitioners do not directly 
challenge any of the Board's factual findings concerning 
the June 16, 1997 industrial accident, we assume that 
they are supported by the record and do not disturb them. 
n5 See Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 312 
(Utah 1997) ("When a party fails to challenge a factual 
finding and marshal the evidence in support of that find-
ing, we 'assume[] that the record supports the fmding[] . . 
. .'" (first alteration in original) (citations omitted)). 
n5 Even if Petitioners had directly chal-
lenged the Board's factual findings concerning 
the June 16, 1997 industrial accident, that chal-
lenge would have failed because Petitioners 
failed to marshal the evidence in support of those 
findings in their opening brief. See Campbell v. 
Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998) ("When a party fails to marshal the 
evidence supporting a challenged fact finding, we 
reject the challenge as nothing more than an at-
tempt to reargue the case before [the appellate] 
court." (alteration in original) (quotations and ci-
tation omitted)). Moreover, after this failure was 
noted by Respondents in their briefs, Petitioners 
attempted to undertake the marshaling burden in 
their reply brief and, after doing so, admitted that 
there was evidence in the record that "could sup-
port" the Board's findings. Our review of the re-
cord indicates that the Board's findings are "sup-
ported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole record." Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-16(4)(g) (2004). 
1**25] 
I*P28] Petitioners also argue that the Board misap-
plied the law to the facts of this case. More specifically, 
Petitioners argue that had the Board made different fac-
tual findings based upon the aforementioned evidence 
that supports their position, it would have reached a dif-
ferent legal conclusion. Given that we have already re-
jected Petitioners' arguments concerning the Board's fac-
tual findings, we must determine whether the Board's 
application of the law to those undisturbed findings "ex-
ceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." 
Smith v. Mity Lite, 939 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct App. 
1997) (quotations and citation omitted). 
[*P29] In relevant part, the statute governing per-
manent total disability compensation benefits provides: 
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent 
total disability compensation, the em-
ployee has the burden of proof to show by 
a preponderance of evidence that: 
(i) the employee sustained 
a significant impairment or 
combination of impair-
ments as a result of the in-
dustrial accident or occu-
pational disease that gives 
rise to the permanent total 
disability entitlement; 
(ii) the employee is perma-
nently totally [**26] dis-
abled; and 
(iii) the industrial accident 
or occupational disease 
was the direct cause of the 
employee's permanent total 
disability. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b)(i)-(iii). 
[*P30] The Board made findings relevant to each 
of these elements. With respect to the first element, the 
ALJ found n6 that "the preponderance of the evidence in 
this case established that [Albert's industrial accident 
with Ameritemps on June 16, 1997[,] caused him a 4% 
whole person impairment due to his left foot injury." The 
ALJ also found that the preponderance of the evidence 
revealed that the injury Albert suffered as a result of the 
June 16, 1997 industrial accident, "with the subsequent 
four surgeries and 4% whole person permanent impair-
ment, proved to be the proverbial straw that broke the 
camel's back." Concerning the second element, the ALJ 
found that Albert "never returned to work after the June 
16, 1997 industrial accident, and thereafter by consensus 
remained permanently and totally disabled." Finally, as 
to the third element, the ALJ found that "the preponder-
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ance of the evidence in this case established that [Al-
bert]^ industrial accident (**27| of June 16, 1997[.] 
acted as the direct cause of his permanent total disabil-
ity." 
n6 In its order, the Board "affirmed and 
adopted [the ALJ]'s findings of fact." 
\P31| Based upon these undisturbed findings, the 
Board concluded that Albert was permanently totally 
disabled and that the June 16, 1997 industrial accident, 
which occurred while Albert was employed by Anier-
itenips, "was the direct cause of his permanent total dis-
ability." Accordingly, the Board entered an award of 
permanent total disability compensation benefits in favor 
of Albert and against Petitioners. Given that the Board 
made the appropriate findings to support its conclusion 
under the statute, we cannot say that its conclusion "ex-
ceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Mity 
Lite, 939 P.2d at 686 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Therefore, we affirm the Board's order denying Petition-
ers' motion for review of the ALJ's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
[*P32] The Board's preliminary determination of 
permanent total [**28] disability is a seriatim final 
agency action, and this court does have subject matter 
jurisdiction to review it. After reviewing the Board's or-
der, we conclude that its factual findings were based 
upon substantial evidence and that its application of the 
law to those findings did not exceed the bounds of rea-
sonableness and rationality. Therefore, we affirm. 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
[*P33| WE CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
'" ' ' illiai i i I hoi ine Jr., Judge 
